# Industrial Security

OCTOBER, 1960

Vol. 4, No. 4

Eric L. Barr, Jr.
and
Hulon D. Cockrell




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REPORT OF THE 6th NATIONAL SEMINAR, DALLAS, TEXAS

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# Industrial Security

Vol. 4, No. 4 OCTOBER, 1960

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Statements of fact and opinion are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply an opinion on the part of the Editor, the Officers, or the membership of ASIS.

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







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

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# 6TH NATIONAL SEMINAR
# WORKSHOPS and ACTIVITIES

## DALLAS, TEXAS

## OCTOBER 3-4-5, 1960

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Dear Dub:

Please accept my heartiest congratulations and sincere thanks for the part that you played in the recent highly successful seminar.

Through your efforts, and those of your committee chairmen, Dallas has achieved a position of eminence in the Society which will be difficult to tie and impossible to beat.

We look forward to the continuing contributions of your fine group to the Society for the coming year.

With kindest personal regards.

Cordially,

Jack Buckley.

John L. Buckley, President
American Society for Industrial Security

JLB:sh

# Pre Seminar Planning

Left to Right: William A. Utnik, Sales Manager Statler-Hilton Hotel; Cliff Larson, Assistant Sales Manager Statler-Hilton Hotel; Hulon Cockrell, General Chairman ASIS Seminar, Temco Electronics & Missiles Company; Joseph A. Harper, General Manager Statler-Hilton Hotel.

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Left to Right: Eric L. Barr, Jr., ASIS President 1959-60, Electric Boat Division, General Dynamics Corporation; Head Chef Statler-Hilton Hotel; Hulon Cockrell, General Chairman ASIS Seminar, Temco Electronics & Missiles Company.

# MEMBERS ARRIVE

## Registration Underway

Hulon Cockrell, ASIS Seminar General Chairman, opens 6th National Seminar.

Robert L. Thornton, Mayor of City of Dallas, welcomes over 300 Seminar Delegates.

# 6th National ASIS Seminar Begins

Greetings from John E. Marrett, Director of Industrial Security Association of Canada.

Greetings from Eric L. Barr, Jr., ASIS President 1959-60.

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

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# 6th NATIONAL SEMINAR WORKSHOPS

## WORKSHOP NO. 1
## "TECHNIQUES OF FIRE INVESTIGATION"

Presiding:
**JOHN J. AHERN**
General Motors, Incorporated
Detroit, Michigan

Panel Participants:
**C. W. STICKNEY** - Chief Investigator
Bureau of Fire
City of Portland, Oregon

**DR. RICHARD STEINMETZ**
Mutual Investigation Bureau
Chicago, Illinois

*Problem*

Incendiary fires have been and are a serious problem in every city in the country. There has been a tendency on the part of industry to believe that such fires only occur in mercantile and dwelling occupancies. It is becoming increasingly apparent that they are also a factor in the industrial fire loss problem.

*Purpose*

In order to obtain more efficient fire investigations in industry, this workshop will present basic material from two outstanding men in this field which will prepare the participants to examine every fire in their plant and answer two basic questions:

1) What caused the fire?

2) Was it arson?

*First Panel Member—Mr. C. W. Stickney*

The first speaker - Chief investigator C. W. Stickney - prepared his material to answer the basic question:

"What caused the fire?" His biography is listed below.

"During 22 years in the fire service, he has spent 18 years in the Fire Prevention Division—as inspector, chief inspector, investigator and for the last 8 years as chief investigator. His classification is Battalion Chief assigned as Chief Investigator.

"He has for several years been vice president of the International Arson Investigators Association for Oregon. He has attended many arson seminars and has given talks on fire and arson investigation at several of these; e.g., University of California, U.C.L.A., Portland State College, and the Washington Fire Officers Command School. He has also conducted fire and arson investigation courses for the Oregon State Department of Vocational Education."

Mr. Stickney pointed out that in the City of Portland, they had uncovered 158 incendiary fires in just four months. He indicated that they did not feel this represented an increase in incendiary fires, but was merely the result of better fire investigations.

The following basic points were stressed by Mr. Stickney:

1) Protect the scene of fire. It is extremely important that the debris be disturbed as little as possible so that valuable evidence will not be lost in the clean-up operation.

2) Determine the time of exposure. This is extremely important as it indicates the relative times during which various portions of structural materials were exposed to excessive heat.

3) Determine the path of travel. This, in effect, is a means of working backwards to determine the point of origin. Fire follows definite natural laws in its spread—based upon draft, vertical openings and other basic features of the structure.

4) Determine the point of origin. This is probably the most important of all because if the point of origin can be ascertained through a study of the travel and exposure time, it is then possible to study all possible sources of ignition in this area and, by a process of elimination, determine that which was most likely to have caused the fire.

Mr. Stickney also presented a tremendous amount of valuable information by means of slides which indicated the characteristic appearance of various materials exposed to fire. This included checking the strata or level above the floor at which burning appeared. He also included data on depth of charring of wood and indicated that a 1" char depth indicated a 45-minute exposure at temperatures between 1400°

*(Continued on next page)*

**Workshop No. 1 *(Continued)***

and 1600° F. Mr. Stickney also showed slides that explained the line of demarcation between burned and unburned portions of materials; a sharp line of demarcation indicating a fast spreading fire and a poor demarcation indicating a slow smouldering fire. He also presented slides showing broken pieces of window glass and the effects of various fires upon them. For example, heavy black stained glass indicated a slow smouldering fire as opposed to minor stains and crazing indicating a fast spreading fire, such as would be expected from gasoline.

*Second Panel Member—Dr. R. C. Steinmetz*

The second speaker—Dr. R. C. Steinmetz—prepared material to answer the question: "Was it arson?" His biography is listed below.

"From 1935 to 1946 he was employed as Chief Investigator by the Mill Mutual Fire Prevention Bureau of Chicago. Prior to that he was engaged in research at the Ohio Penitentiary for three years. He has been actively engaged in the investigation of arson and kindred crimes for the past 26 years.

"In 1947 he was appointed Chief Special Agent of the Mutual Investigation Bureau of Chicago. That Bureau is a division of the Mutual Loss Research Bureau. It is an association supported by a number of mutual fire insurance companies, and was established for the purpose of giving aid and assistance in the fight against those who commit arson or a kindred crime, or who attempt to defraud the companies and their policyholders. The special agents of the Mutual Investigation Bureau operate on a nationwide basis.

He is editor of the New Letter issued by the International Association of Arson Investigators, an associate editor of POLICE Journal, a member of the Committee on Arson of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and a member of a similar committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

"He is a graduate of Muhlenberg College, Indiana University, and the Ohio State University."

Dr. Steinmetz's theme was that arson is often used as an excuse for poor inspection, poor protection and poor fire fighting. He made a strong plea to the effect that ASIS should collect data on industrial arson.

Dr. Steinmetz pointed out that thefts, vandalism and burglaries are relatively easy to recognize, however, arson is extremely difficult to pinpoint and, what is even more important, it is almost impossible to prevent. In evaluating a fire from the arson standpoint, he indicated that three basic questions must be answered.

1) Who would be interested in setting a fire?
2) Why would he want to set a fire?
3) Who had the opportunity to set it at that particular time and place?

Dr. Steinmetz pointed out that industrial security personnel have set up programs to prevent and detect all types of industrial dishonesty and protection problems; however, the least anticipated crime in industrial security is arson. Dr. Steinmetz listed the following motives as typical of those involved in arson cases:

1) To cover other crimes (particularly thefts)
2) To destroy records (particularly where embezzlement or forgery is involved)
3) To conceal burglaries, robberies or murders
4) To divert attention of Plant Protection Personnel so that looting can be accomplised
5) Intimidation
6) To secure employment
7) To gain recognition
8) To get revenge in retaliation for real or imagined wrongs
9) To accomplish sabotage or work stoppage
10) Psychological purges such as possessed by pyromaniacs (this is not considered a serious problem in industrial arson)

Dr. Steinmetz, in summing up his discussion, indicated that it is very difficult to prove that arson was committed, and it requires painstaking investigation. In order to gain a conviction, it is necessary to establish beyond a shadow of a doubt these basic points:

1) A fire actually occurred.
2) The starting of this fire was a deliberate act.
3) The accused was definitely responsible through an unbroken series of events, starting with the ignition of materials.

*Discussion and Conclusion*

There was considerable discussion from the floor based upon the foregoing material. Most of the questions were directed towards Dr. Steinmetz and many of them had to do with the psychological factors involved in fire setting. He indicated that in many respects, this has been over-emphasized and provided an easy explanation for those arsonists who are apprehended and also tends to obtain the sympathy of authorities for the accused.

The discussion was concluded with the plea for all members of ASIS to make thorough investigations of every fire which occurs in the plants within their jurisdictions.

# WHERE ARE YOU IN THE SECURITY PICTURE?

Keylock Model **1940**



Bar Lock Model **1950**



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# WORKSHOP NO. 2

# "BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS"

Presiding:
**GEORGE D. HIGGINS, JR.**
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San Diego, California

Panel Participants:
**RUSSELL E. WHITE**
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Schenactady, New York

**EUGENE H. WALKER**
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American Security Council
Chicago, Illinois

**FRANK F. LINDSEY**
Retail Credit Company
Dallas, Texas

**CLARENCE BRACY**
General Plant Protection Corporation
Los Angeles, California

## WHY BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS: POLICIES, PRACTICES, TECHNIQUES AND PROBLEMS

By RUSSELL WHITE

The subject of background investigations is relatively new in the United States. It is certainly safe to say that prior to 1940 very few companies conducted any type of investigation of their employees. With the approach of World War II, it became evident to intelligence agencies that America's capability of adequately defending itself depended primarily on its productive capacity. It became apparent that the persons employed by industry must be beyond suspicion as far as their loyalty went in order that internal sabotage would not occur. There then was born the lengthy application form and the investigation of facts contained therein. With the ending of the war many companies continued background investigations, realizing that what was adopted as a wartime measure, actually was a good, sound business practice.

It appears that the chief objection to background investigations for applicants for employment is financial. How often have you heard—investigations cost money. The answer, from those who have had experience in background investigations, is that they do not cost money, but rather that they save money. Despite the era in which we live, with all its technological advancement, there is no question but what a company's employees are and will be its greatest asset.

Files throughout industry are replete with cases where background investigations have successfully eliminated from employment dope addicts, arsonists, convicted embezzlers, prostitutes and homosexuals. It just does not make good business sense to hire an employee as casually as we would buy a loaf of bread. In the purchase of a machine for the factory floor costing thousands of dollars, a very thorough check is made on its performance, capabilities, competition, etc., and yet, in altogether too many instances where the investment may be far greater, an individual is hired much as one would buy a "pig in a poke."

Whenever anyone in the future suggests to you that a pre-employment investigative program is too costly, I trust your answer will be, "You cannot afford to be without it."

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## RESEARCH AND INFORMATION CENTERS ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY

By JACK ISON

There are several not-for-profit organizations in this country which collect and disseminate information on subversive activities. We have the American Library of Information in Los Angeles, the Western Research Foundation in San Francisco and the American Security Council in Chicago. I believe that the methods of collection and dissemination of information are similar, and while I will necessarily describe what the American Security Council does, I think what I will say will be generally true of the other organizations.

*(Continued on page 16)*

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**Workshop No. 2 *(Continued)***

We do not do investigations on individuals in the strict sense of the word. Our ability to supply you with information is based on our files. The files have been compiled from five main sources: (1) information disseminated by the government; (2) the publications of the Communist Party itself and its front groups and splinter groups; (3) the public press; (4) information furnished by interested individuals and organizations; and (5) the so-called right wing publications.

The Council's files are open to member companies, government agencies and certain other qualified persons. We do not disclose any information regarding the use of the Council's files by any specific company.

When we find derogatory information on an individual or organization, we collate the information into a report. The aim of the report is to present the facts without opinion or conclusion. There are no recommendations as to what decision the member company should make. Generally speaking, we document our sources of information. Where appropriate, we furnish photostats of the documents supporting the report.

We recently entered the field of making reports on non-profit, non-charitable organizations active in the field of economics, public affairs and foreign affairs. Apart from the actual requests for money, company executives are deluged with requests to participate in an organization, to speak at a meeting of an organization, or to serve on the Boards of various organizations. If the organization turns out to be a wrong one, the company may experience acute embarrassment.

Our aim in a report on an organization is to provide the member companies with all the facts needed to make a decision on whether to support or participate in the organization. The report differs from our standard reports in that all pertinent outside sources of information are used in addition to the information we already have on file. The finished report, if we've been successful in doing our job, will contain detailed information regarding the organizational structure, objectives, activities, publications, staff, finances, fund-raising techniques and effectiveness of the organization.

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## INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

**By FRANK F. LINDSEY**

For more than sixty years, well-established, nationally-known investigative agencies have been operating in our country. The operation of these agencies has been made through the need of many businesses for information about people, places and things. The acceptance of these investigative agencies, while dependent on many factors, has been primarily due to three great assets. These are availability, dependability and variability.

*Availability*: At the finger tips of business there are available through the use of investigative agencies thousands of well-selected, trained investigators, strategically located throughout North America, to get such information as business may want or need on a moment's notice.

*Dependability*: Regardless of the availability, the number of men and the places where these men are located would be of no value to business unless business can depend on the results. Dependability in the investigative business begins with the selection of the investigators. After selection, a carefully planned training program to develop a sound knowledge of why and how business information is used is forcefully given. The well operated investigative company will regularly review the performance of its investigators to be certain that the training given is being utilized and that the investigators are themselves dependable.

*Variability*: With continent-wide coverage of North America, you have available to you services which can interview one or a thousand people in one or a thousand places, simultaneously, if need be. Services are available to meet the needs of any type of business.

The flexibility of your investigative companies will make available to you in the future services not previously rendered. These investigative companies are ready and anxious to give to American business the services of their personnel to secure any type of information legitimately needed in the conduct of their business.

To integrate into any company interested in security or pre-employment information, regardless of size, the company must recognize and be convinced that the outside agency can and will do a complete, dependable investigative job for them. What may seem to be a big cost item in the beginning can very easily and quickly be turned into profit momentarily and intangibly, such as a better selection of employees, better employee morale and reduced turnover.

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## OUR EXPERIENCE IN USING THE POLYGRAPH FOR BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS

**By CLARENCE BRACY**

Most of us are generally familiar with or have heard about the use of the polygraph insofar as criminal investigative techniques are concerned. The polygraph, commonly referred to as the "lie detector,"

has been extremely helpful to those in law enforcement when interrogating persons suspected of crimes. The techniques, equipment and general "state of the art" have been gradually refined over a period of years, so that today a most valuable tool is available to law enforcement agencies in solving crimes.

Like any other tool, the polygraph must be properly used to be effective. Without proper use, unsatisfactory results might follow. There are several makes and types of lie detection equipment on the market. Probably each of these is suitable for obtaining the required results—the main thing is, however, the examiner. Without a qualified and competent examiner, the apparatus is worthless.

We, at General Plant, believe the use of lie detection techniques has greater application in the area of pre-employment screening than in the area of criminal investigations. This is particularly true in the field of Industrial Security. General Plant has used lie detection equipment for pre-employment screening and investigating backgrounds of prospective employees since 1954. We estimate that we have reduced the cost of our background investigations by approximately 59%. We have refined our program to the point where we feel it is unnecessary to conduct either a limited or full field investigation except in rare instances. We have eliminated time consuming delays in processing our applicants. For those of you who are statistically minded, our records indicate 7% of the prospective employees were rejected based on polygraph findings, during the last year. These were prospective employees who would otherwise have been eligible for employment. Although we have always enjoyed a rather low rate of employee turnover, the use of the polygraph has made further reduction in this regard. It is also interesting to note that we have never experienced a denial of clearance by government agencies for those employees who have undergone a polygraph examination.

In summation, we heartily recommend the use of the polygraph as a means of conducting background investigations. The only limitation is that the background investigation obviously must be known to the subject. It is also obvious that the polygraph is of no value if an investigation is to be conducted unknown to the subject. In most cases of pre-employment screening however, this does not present a problem and the subject willingly submits to the examination.


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# WORKSHOP NO. 3

# "THEFTS - INTERNAL"

Presiding:

**TIMOTHY J. WALSH**
Sperry Gyroscope Company
Division of Sperry Rand Corporation
Great Neck, Long Island, New York

Panel Participants:

**LeROY H. BARNARD**
Lockheed Aircraft Service New York Incorporated
New York International Airport
Jamaica 30, Long Island, New York

**ALFRED B. BERRY**
Douglas Aircraft Company
Santa Monica, California

**WALLACE D. BEASLEY**
Texas A & M College
College Station, Texas



## DISPOSITION OF INCIDENTS — SPECIAL PROJECTS

By TIMOTHY WALSH

Previous panelists have discussed motives, methods, prevention and detection of what we defined in the beginning as "Internal Theft." Our natural focus of attention is now on the subject of treatment or disposition. What ought to be done with the detected thief?

The first consideration is whether or not the security organization has any proper, further interest in the culprit. I feel the security department which conducted the successful investigation should render an advisory opinion to management who must dispose of the thief. I feel also that all such opinions must be rendered with full awareness of the whole industrial ambient, the worker morale, the extent of the theft, the record of the thief, the labor climate, etc. Specifically, the following items should be considered in detail before any recommendation is made.

1. *Should the thief be prosecuted?* More elementary still, should there be a company policy on prosecutions? If it is known beforehand that a firm will not prosecute, the deterrent effect of fear of arrest and prison is lost. All other deterrents (guards, alarms, pass systems) are immediately made less effective by an established policy of "No Prosecution". To accept a reduced deterrent without good reason is wasteful. Let's look then at the reasons usually advanced for a policy of "No Prosecution".

   a. The alleged bad public relations effect of a stronger policy.

   b. The possibility of damage action against the company should a criminal prosecution prove unsuccessful.

   c. Dismissal is sufficient punishment for a guilty employee.

The better approach, I think, is this: Detected thefts will be prosecuted as a matter of policy except where special circumstances indicate otherwise. This puts the emphasis on the likelihood of prosecutive action while retaining ability to depart from the standard when the interests of effective management would be better served by so doing. I would recommend as the minimum penalty in every case of theft a termination warning—a positive statement that one recurrence of any type of theft will bring immediate, dishonorable dismissal.

2. *Position of the Collective Bargaining Agent*— As a rule, it would seem reasonable and safe to follow this course:

   a. Elicit union support for the theoretical desirability of honest employees and condemnation of theft as a matter of policy;

   b. Do not seek or expect offical union cooperation or assistance during the actual conduct of investigations;

   c. Prepare your discipline cases well enough so that culpability of the subject is clear and the union leadership can accept the discipline imposed without fear of censure from their membership.

3. *How much publicity?* Generally, it is probably good to afford each incident enough publicity so that other workers are aware that a dishonest fellow employee has been detected and punished. In those cases which are prosecuted or which gain attention outside the work place, it will be necessary to provide public media with enough facts to make a complete news item.

Now, I should like to discuss several special problems that often complicate a theft investigation or affect the prior formulation of policy.

*(Continued on page 20)*







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1. *Constitutional Rights* — In these instances, there is no question of Constitutional Rights. The Constitutional amendments guaranteeing civil liberties apply only to acts of government, not to acts of individuals.

2. *Entrapment* — Here again, there is no question of entrapment. Entrapment is defined as the act of officers or agents of the government in inducing a person to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.

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## TECHNIQUES OF DETECTION

**By LeROY BARNARD**

Having assured ourselves that we are thoroughly conversant with the problems that the very nature of our plant operation imposes, we must undertake a study of the methods by which we propose to safeguard the property of our company. Regardless of the business in which we are engaged, there is one barometer that is common to all industry and will tell us with unfailing accuracy whether or not we are earning our keep. I refer to the property inventory. A shrinking inventory, not accounted for by documents authorizing use, sale, removal or destruction, points an accusing finger at the Plant Protection Department and asks, "What have you been doing?". Inasmuch as we do not have the perfect method of inventory control, let us look at some of the more productive methods of detection of theft.

Certainly, nothing is going to be quite as effective as a reliable informant network. The development of this network is extremely difficult and, unless you are able to inspire confidence in the employees who can furnish information, absolutely impossible.

Successful precautions are not possible without competent investigation. If you do not have your own investigative section, you still have two excellent investigative units at your disposal: The Detective Bureau of your own local law enforcement unit, for non-government property, and the Federal Bureau of investigation, for government property. Notwithstanding the fact that you have this talent at your beck and call, you must be prepared to make an intelligent presentation to these investigative units before you call on them for assistance. Evidence of theft must be developed by your own people or by a private investigative organization.

All of us undoubtedly use electronic alarms to augment our normal guard force. We wish that we could induce our companies to install and use closed circuit television. The mere knowledge that such equipment is in use is a most compelling deterrent to theft.

Constant spot checks must be made for possible variances between items listed on our shipping documents and the receiving memorandums of the organization to which it was destined. A single error will quickly allow you to set up controls to determine whether or not this was indeed an error or a part of a pattern to remove property from the plant unlawfully.

If the stolen property is subject to adequate description and identification, notify: (1) the National Stolen Property File of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (2) the Pawn Shop Detail of the local police department; and (3) industrial security officers in your own industry.

Our employers should not be led down the primrose path in believing that every item of property stolen will be recovered. It is better to tell them frankly that they might as well write off the value of the stolen property and be satisfied with catching and prosecuting the thief. Potential thieves are usually discouraged by quick arrests and successful prosecutions of individuals to whom they have knowledge.

If I were asked to give just two words that might describe a good program of protection of company property, they would be: (1) PREVENTION and (2) PROSECUTION.

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## METHODS OF PREVENTION

**By AL BERRY**

In 1959, according to the New York State Labor Department, American industry lost one billion dollars as a result of embezzlement and related crimes. Over two hundred firms will have closed their doors because of these losses. Although these are staggering figures, it is fair to assume that additional millions of dollars are lost annually but never brought to the attention of police agencies due to the promise of restitution, management's desire to avoid publicity or management's embarrassment in acknowledging that such a loss could occur. Based on the aforementioned facts, there is no reason to believe that such losses will be less in 1960. In fact, they probably will exceed the figures for 1959.

The startling fact that should not be overlooked is that a considerable portion of the annual losses due to theft are directly attributable to the nefarious actions of local and trusted employees. No matter how carefully employees are screened, the total elimination of security problems cannot be assured. The problems can be reduced to a minimum; but, allowing for human nature, management must accept the fact that thieves and embezzlers will always be at work.

*(Continued on page 22)*

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


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**Workshop No. 3 *(Continued)***

The problem of providing adequate internal security is quite complex, and to be acceptable to management, its costs must be reasonable and such measures which are instituted must not interfere with the efficiency of plant operation. Various methods of theft prevention exist, including:

1. Adequate screening of all new employees.

2. An active employee and supervision educational program.

3. A thoroughly trained and alert guard force.

4. An adequate perimeter fence which surrounds the entire plant.

5. The utilization of barred windows, adequate lighting and burglar alarms, where a fence is not available.

6. The location and availability of certain key operating and administrative areas, specifically shipping and receiving.

7. The location of any department handling large sums of cash, such as payroll.

8. Close watch over the salvage area and definite procedures for the control of property.

9. Control of tool cribs and supply rooms.

10. A good lock and key system.

11. A good parcel control system.

12. The control of in-plant parking.

13. Visitor registration and escort procedures.

In conclusion, certain obvious problems of security cannot be ignored by thoughtful businessmen, regardless of the size or character of their firms. The extensive losses suffered from larceny, pilferage, embezzlement, malicious mischief, etc., assuredly take these crimes out of the nuisance category. Unless management takes a positive approach and does something to alter the conditions which permitted the wrongs to take place, drains on profits, efficiency and employee morale surely will continue despite the best guards, alarms and insurance policies. Efficiency, safety and security represent mutually compatible elements of a successful business operation. The forward looking executive can only benefit by taking security considerations into account when planning improved operations on increased profits.

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## THEFTS — INTERNAL

**By WALLACE BEASLEY**

A theft hazard may be considered to be any place where a theft is likely to occur. Some of the hazards are: tool cribs, stock rooms, shipping and receiving docks, cafeteria, scrap or salvage pile, parking lots, cloak rooms, locker rooms, petty cash drawer, company gasoline pumps, counter and window displays, cash registers and dressing rooms.

Dishonest employees include all classes from the private secretary to, in some instances, top management. It could be the cashier, bookkeeper, clerk, checker, truckman, loader, stock clerk, purchasing agent, auditor or janitor. Some are professional thieves, some are occasional thieves. Whether or not one is a thief depends on the interpretation. If we class a person as a thief who carries away pencils, scotch tape, stamps, etc., the number of thieves would be staggering.

The causes of internal theft include:

1. The "lone operator" with avarice as a motive, which is brought about as a result of:
   a. The prosperity of the nation—high cost of living, high taxes.
   b. The feeling of the employee that stealing from a corporation is not theft—"They can afford it and the company won't miss such small things."
   c. Stealing to spite the owner.

2. The compulsive theft with psychological problems.

3. Commercial or organizational theft—an outlet exists for selling stolen goods.

4. Dishonesty brought on by management pressures.

Employees steal more than 4 million dollars a day. The theft of goods and materials runs seven times as great as theft of cash. Kickbacks, bribes, etc., will total 5 billion dollars annually. The brunt of the cost is borne by the consumer. The overall level of consumer prices could be reduced as much as 15% if dishonesty and shady practices were eliminated.

In addition to the direct financial loss, other consequences of internal theft include:

1. Possible contract delay resulting in loss of thousands of dollars and costly loss of time trying to locate or replace stolen goods.

2. Poor publicity that sometimes results.

3. Lowered employee morale, which is a result of:
   a. Workers losing respect for the company, management and the security department.
   b. Developing distrust among employees.
   c. Working a hardship on honest employees.
   d. Setting a poor example for new employees.

# WORKSHOP NO. 4

# "PROTECTION OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION"

Presiding:

**ROBERT J. BOISE**
Ford Motor Company
Dearborn, Michigan

Panel Participants:

**FRANK L. DOUGHERTY**
Hercules Powder Company, Incorporated
Wilmington, Delaware

**WILLIAM S. DENIGER**
Texas Instruments, Incorporated
Dallas, Texas

**GLENN V. DIERST**
Boeing Airplane Company
Seattle, Washington

**BENJAMIN W. TANNER**
Los Angeles Air Procurement Dist.
Los Angeles, California

**The Panel** was opened with a definition of Proprietary Information, as follows:

"Proprietary information is information which is possessed by the owners or managers of a business operation having a definite value and connected uniquely with the conduct of the business. It is usually distinguished by the fact it is in some degree recognized by law as the property of the business and as such, its competitors are denied the general use thereof without the owner's consent."

**Glenn Dierst,** commenting on the "Protection of Proprietary Information," in the aircraft industry, pointed to the following considerations:

"All business concerns to maintain their competitive position must protect certain proprietary information against untimely release or disclosure. Time is of the essence, since most industrial information requires eventual release for sales promotion or subcontracted components to be manufactured; however, premature disclosure could cause competitive damage.

"Some of the general areas which are considered sensitive and should be protected are (1) financial planning; (2) commitments of Company resources; (3) bid data; (4) product selection, and its manufacturing status; (5) research and development; and (6) potential litigation.

". . . Overclassification, such as often occurs with Military Information, must be avoided or mitigated since promiscuous classification will always reduce the effectiveness of the protection system and impose economic and delaying burdens. . . .

"The protection of classified hardware within the aircraft industry is a difficult problem, particularly within the commercial aviation field, since the size of the product and the number of people who must have access to it presents many problems. When a prototype aircraft reaches the mock-up or metal cutting stage its existence is generally well known within the industry. However, it is essential that as much information as possible be kept from the competitor. At this stage of development it becomes necessary to have a large number of personnel involved, including employees, customers and subcontractors. Information which can be kept from the competitor are special manufacturing techniques, design information, and fabrication progress.

"In order to minimize the amount of information which might leak out, it is imperative that centralized control be established. This is generally accomplished by having the product assembled in a walled-off area, and before anyone is permitted to gain access his need must be approved by this central office, which is generally the office of the Project Manager. A coordinated arrangement is developed between this organization and the Security Department who carry out the enforcement of controlled access. In most cases special passes or access lists are used.

"The timeliness and extent of the material which is released either to customers, the public or subcontractors is controlled through this centralized source in coordination with Sales, Materiel and other departments, depending upon the status of the project at any particular time."

**F. L. Dougherty,** commenting on "Protection of 'Know-How' in the Chemical Field," emphasized the following:

"In the chemical industry it is particularly true that the protection of proprietary information may be vital to economic survival. You have heard a definition of proprietary information and I would like to emphasize that my discussion excludes patented material. In one sense a patent is the antithesis of our subject matter. One of the conditions in the patent concept is full disclosure of the patentable idea. Proprietary information, or if you prefer its synonyms 'know-how', 'technical data' or 'trade secrets', loses its value through disclosure. As a matter of fact, new developments often pose the problem of whether to file patent ap-

*(Continued on next page)*

plications or attempt to retain the information by protecting it as a trade secret. . . .

"I do not believe the overt attempts to steal corporate secrets are out of hand, yet we should recognize that there are unethical persons in all walks of life and the probability exists that some attempt will be made to steal a good secret given the right conditions to make such a theft economically valuable. The real problem is the casual and inadvertent loss of a secret. But in either case the loss may cause irreparable harm.

"There are many ways to protect proprietary information. One way is to not advertise the fact that there is a secret to be protected. For example, in the plastics field a company may manufacture a product realizing that its competitors can analyze the ingredients and reconstruct to a certain extent the manufacturing processes. . . . Meanwhile the company discourages even the mention of the fact that its product is made by a secret process. . . .

"Now let us talk about techniques of protection. There should be a top level policy statement pointing out the fact that proprietary information or trade secrets constitute an important asset to the company and that the only way in which these assets may be retained is to keep them confidential. This policy statement should define proprietary information. . . .

". . . All new employees should be apprised of the company's policy relative to proprietary information. It may be desirable to have employees sign a notice or agreement to this effect. . . .

"In this discussion of the protection of proprietary information, I am not advocating that proprietary information be classified or stamped as we now stamp Government classified information. This is a difficult task and your purpose can normally be accomplished through a general approach. . . .

". . . Reputable companies will avoid the use of unique 'know-how' which an employee gained while working with a previous employer. In this example it becomes highly important that the exit interview be handled properly and thoroughly. If the employee joining a competitor uses your information to help your competitor, he is, for all practical purposes, committing a theft and the competitor may be considered an accessory. Remedies lie in civil suits for injunctions and damages.

". . . Generally speaking, however, legal remedies are incommensurate with the actual losses which may be incurred. . . .

". . . Employee awareness is the most important factor in a program for the protection of proprietary data. The dissipation of assets, represented by 'know-how', because of a failure to maintain a low-cost minimal educational program, is well-nigh inexcusable in this enlightened age."

**Willian Deniger,** in reviewing the things to be considered by a subcontractor in protecting the proprietary information of a prime contractor, gave particular attention to good communication between the prime contractor and the subcontractor as to the exact materials to be safeguarded and to the protective procedures of the prime contractor which affected the subcontractor's activities. Thereafter, the strongest deterrent can be realized by educating the subcontractor's employees as to their responsibility and conducting a continual emphasis program to keep this responsibility before their attention.

**R. J. Boise** discussed "Defensive Techniques Against Industrial Spying" activities with particular treatment of the following methods:

"The modern industrial spy, alert to the times, has turned in his cloak and dagger for electronic recorders, hidden cameras, and special telephone wiretaps. His new look, due in part to the availability of sophisticated spy devices, is causing many companies to step up their internal security programs.

"Companies on the losing end of a spy campaign find that information reaches competitors in one of two ways: either through carefully-planned action by the competitors' spies or through unintentional leaking by their own personnel. In either case, the results can be damaging.

"A surprising amount of information is literally given away to competitors through regular business channels. One lucrative source of information is a company's sales team. In the course of a day's selling, a sales representative may discuss prices, quality control, and other matters with customers who, in turn, deal with competitors. In many cases, customers pass along—knowingly or not—important information.

"The salesman, of course, isn't the only one who leaks confidential information. Engineers, researchers and others who attend trade meetings and professional seminars often find themselves discussing process and product information normally unavailable to competitors. Discussion turns naturally to industry standards and technical advances, and confidential items often find their way into the open. An employee's enthusiasm for a new development or his need to feel important have led to discussion of long-range plans with a consequent violation of security.

"Not all leaks, of course, involve face-to-face contact. Competitors seriously in search of information often need go only as far as the nearest published market research. Market surveys, when read with care and in conjunction with other surveys, yield bits and scraps of information that might be otherwise unobtainable. In furnishing information to trade publications or to independent business surveys, companies should insure that the ultimate use of their data will not tip their industrial hand. . . .

"Given an all-out spying effort, one of the most difficult techniques to guard against is the activity of

a professional undercover agent or his co-conspirator, the spying employee. These agents and quasi-agents, trained collectors of information, are among the most difficult spies to detect. Fortunately, there are a number of precautions that can be taken to minimize undercover spying activity. Some of these are listed below:

"Investigate persons who will have access to confidential information.

"Be on the alert for disloyal, irresponsible, or disgruntled employees.

"Promote company loyalty, security awareness, and employee responsibility.

"Stress repeatedly the importance of keeping statistical information from unauthorized persons.

"Avoid discussing confidential matters over the telephone or in public places.

"When planning a project or operation, there are additional measures that may be taken. These measures include the following:

"Use project or code names instead of descriptive terminology to conceal or disguise a product from competition.

"Control the disposal of confidential waste material.

"Instruct security patrols to periodically check locked locations and to pick up material left on desks or other unsecured locations.

"Periodically change locks on doors and desks.

"Even after these precautions are taken, a security system must meet a final test: the hidden recording device. This technique is the most difficult of all spying devices to guard against because effective control depends as much on top management as it does on security forces. Top-level men faced with the possibilty of electronic spying should be encouraged to do the following:

"When involved in an important project, realize that the incidence of spying may increase.

"Be alert to suspicious packages in waiting rooms, lobbies, washrooms, etc.

"Be suspicious of strangers calling at executive offices and insist on thorough visitor identification and investigation.

"Investigate any unusual calls or interruptions or, better yet, refrain from discussing important issues by telephone.

"Verify the identity of all linemen and utility service men working in executive offices.

"None of these suggestions will be effective, of course, unless security and company personnel constantly remind themselves of the need for caution. Security, like liberty, requires eternal vigilance.

"Even the most efficient security system will have occasional leaks, particularly when trained operatives are used. But this doesn't diminish the basic importance of a company's security program. If a company will make it difficult for industrial spying to operate, and will guard against inadvertent disclosure, then its security program will be well worth the effort."


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# WORKSHOP NO. 5
# "WHY EMERGENCY OR DISASTER PLANNING"

Presiding:
**KENNETH E. YANDELL**
Esso Standard Division
Humble Oil and Refining Company
New York, New York

Panel Participants:
**IRVIN E. HIBBS**
American Synthetic Rubber Corporation
Louisville, Kentucky

**ALBRECHT G. WAMBACH**
American Telephone and Telegraph Company
New York, New York

**RALPH A. PRICE**
Security Consultant
State House
Augusta, Maine

The "Why Emergency or Disaster Planning" question would appear to be axiomatic. Any thinking group, whether it be industry, business, civil defense or what have you, would not have to debate this point. Any executive who is concerned with disaster, either man made or natural, is going to make provision for such emergencies if he has the interests of his responsibilities at heart. It's rather like sin, you just don't argue favorably for sin.

Some will debate that the setting up and testing of disaster plans is too expensive. This is debatable. Of course, if one goes overboard and establishes a plan entirely out of keeping with the needs, this contention may have some merit. But, when one considers that a disaster may wipe out sizeable segments of the personnel and corporate records, such would offset a sizeable planning program.

Many companies have well thought out and planned programs on paper. Even though they have never been tested through dry runs, it is still that much better than where there are no plans at all.

It is felt that in view of present day hazards, conducive to creating a major emergency arising from natural causes, industrial destructive potentials and world tension, emergency and disaster plans provide the primary instrument by which a constructive objective can be reached. However, plans to be of any value must be simple in nature, definite in the priority of action, mechanics of execution, and capable of only one interpretation.

Emergency and disaster plans are designed to afford the maximum amount of protection in preserving life and property by preparing for, and providing the means for, carrying out emergency functions to protect, prevent, minimize, repair and recover from injury and damage. Through this medium it may contain and sustain our country's resources and economic status in the world of nations.

A plan contains general instructions and overall detailed methods of operation. It also sets forth the need for such a plan and allocates the responsibilities and duties of all personnel who must participate in its execution.

A plan expedites the familiarization of all personnel in the application of emergency measures to be taken in the safeguarding and protection of personnel, company facilities or installation, continuity of production and management as well as emergency maintenance action. It reduces the effects of a disaster and brings about the quickest possible resumption of recovery and activity in production. Last but not least, it also provides a medium through which confusion and chaos can be limited and contained by designating command responsibility. Without this important factor no objective can be successfully realized. No plan is considered perfect, however, it produces a basis and guide for the immediate organization and coordination of multiple action in the event of an emergency.

In the event of another war between nations in possession of nuclear armament, the difference between victory and defeat will depend on which country can resume its industrial production first. Speed in rapid recovery is a result of early and proper planning and preparation. However, do not confuse speed with haste.

In order to protect and give greater assurance of production continuity in case of an emergency, disaster or attack upon this country, management should formulate a plan of action with specific emphasis based upon the preservation of their employees.

It is presumed that the men and women of this country will carry out, willingly and intelligently, the provisions of a plan if they are thoroughly oriented as to the purpose and the part they are to play in expediting and attaining the desired overall objective, and know that their interest and safety is being cared for. In an emergency or disaster, organized groups of people accustomed to working together are invaluable. Our factories, homes, buildings, cities, and their component parts can be rebuilt, but life cannot be replaced. Therefore, plans must include and provide for the safety and survival of our people by the best means available if they are to survive and recover rapidly from a disaster caused by accident, natural or man-made. "People are our Nation's most precious resource." No effort, no cost can be too great in preserving and safeguarding this resource, so vital to our existence as a Nation.

The American Telephone and Telegraph Company film, "Seconds for Survival," was made a part of the program which entailed some 27 minutes running time. Being a recently released film, it was the first showing in the State of Texas. It is strongly recommended for industry, business and groups of any kind. It in itself was a most impressive "why" when an emergency or disaster planning program is under consideration.

# WORKSHOP NO. 6

# "FUNDAMENTALS OF EMERGENCY AND DISASTER PLANNING"

Presiding:

**THOMAS W. RYAN**
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Buffalo, New York

Panel Participants:

**A. ROSS MILLER**
North American Aviation, Incorporated
El Segundo, California

**IRVIN E. HIBBS**
American Synthetic Rubber Corporation
Louiville, Kentucky

**VIRGIL L. COUCH**
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Battle Creek, Michigan

**KENNETH E. YANDELL**
Esso Standard Division
Humble Oil and Refining Company
New York, New York

**RUDOLPH L. MILLER**
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Buffalo, New York

**RICHARD L. WHELAND**
Jones & Laughlin Steel Company
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

**FRANK S. GALLAGHER**
Manager Security Department
Industrial Relations Staff
Ford Motor Company—Ford Division
Dearborn, Michigan

**HAROLD L. STOUT**
Research Division
Midwest Research Institute
Kansas City, Missouri

**Mr. Ryan — Chairman**

ASIS is playing an important role in our Nation's defense effort by stimulating interest and focusing attention on emergency and disaster planning for industry—an important phase of our overall industrial security program. Assembled here in Dallas are key security officials from a majority of the Nation's great industrial facilities as well as the representatives of our Armed Forces. Each person present is contributing much to the development of our industrial security programs in his respective area of responsibility. We point with pride to our industrial facilities and the great national products which pour forth from them as proof of the superiority of our system of production. It follows logically in the event of war that our industrial facilities would be prime targets. The first blow in a nuclear war would certainly pack a devastating wallop. Whether the future will spew forth another terrible war or that we are in for a long cold war which may last through a lifetime is left to sinister conjecture. The future behavior of our enemies does not lend itself to slide rule calculations. Lacking an infallible test, a good substitute is an honest, sincere judgment by individuals who have been trained academically and are experienced in preparing for such a contingency.

**Ross Miller**

As a panel member I would like to make some provocative statements on emergency and disaster planning. In thinking of disaster planning, people always think of the mushroom-shaped cloud and nuclear fallout. It is my desire to nibble at one phase of overall disaster planning and not relate it to nuclear attack in the hope that it can be of some practical assistance to the men in the field who must meet emergencies and threats of emergencies on a day-to-day basis. Many fine articles have been written on this subject and Government Printing Office publications are available as guides for setting up complete emergency self-help programs for large or small industries. Generally, when organizations in industry plan for handling emergency situations it appears easy to assume the emergency will happen when the plant is fully populated. Under these circumstances, management and emergency service supervision would be ready and able to operate effectively. Should an emergency occur during nights, week-ends or holidays in plants that are operated by skeleton crews, it is this type of one man show which places great responsibilities on a single man or a handful of persons and requires immediate action and unprecedented boldness to alleviate the situation. There will be no time to call the most qualified supervisors at home and explain the situation and await their direction. Immediate action by a small crew at the outset may be more beneficial than to waste one man's time trying to reach higher authority. I strongly recommend that any emergency consider this contingency.

*(Continued on next page)*

Workshop No. 6 *(Continued)*

**Irvin E. Hibbs**

Discussed the ASIS Program for Emergency and Disaster Control and he received many fine comments on his outstanding job of developing the July issue of *Industrial Security* which featured articles by ASIS members on various methods of planning for industrial defense and survival. Much of the panel discussion related to measures taken within and among industrial plants to minimize the effects of enemy attack or natural disasters. Mr. Hibbs emphasized the fact that industrial survival and recovery can be assured only by careful planning. He also discussed in detail the program in effect in his own organization. Many comments from the audience indicated their approval of the outstanding job done by Mr. Hibbs and their appreciation for his efforts.

*Discussion*:

1. Management Responsibilities
2. Continuity of Management
3. Coordinator of Plan
4. Emergency Services
5. Functions of the Services
6. Civil Defense Steps

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Brief Summary of Introductory Remarks by **Virgil L. Couch,** Director, Industry Office, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization at the Sixth National Seminar, October 4, 1960 — Workshop VI "Fundamentals of Emergency and Disaster Planning"

Recovery of the United States following a nuclear attack could depend in large measure on how thoroughly American industry has prepared to survive an attack and resume production. In preparing for industrial survival certain principles must be observed, such as (1) anticipate problems and plan for solutions before disaster occurs (2) prepare for self-help (3) plan for mutual assistance (4) normal government leadership must survive and continue (5) civil defense preparedness must become a normal way of life.

The steps which industrial management should take to protect personnel, plants and equipment from enemy attack—and to assure industrial survival and continuity of production following attack should include: (1) organize for self-help (2) plan for evacuation (3) provide shelters for employees (4) plan for continuity of management (5) protect vital records (6) plan for emergency repair and restoration (7) provide plant security against sabotage and espionage (8) establish industrial mutual-aid associations for civil defense (9) deconcentrate production (10) disperse new industrial plants. These are commonly referred to as the ten steps to industrial survival.

As a guide in taking these ten steps I urge that you use the July 1960 issue of *Industrial Security* magazine which has been especially prepared by ASIS for this purpose.

Carrying out these steps will involve a number of complex problems but none of the problems are as complex as the ones American industry would face the day following nuclear attack.

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## ELECTRONICS IN SECURITY

**By R. L. MILLER**

Knowing that all Security and Protection people are cost-conscious and budget-conscious to provide the finest security and protection for the least amount of dollars, I am departing from the scheduled subject of this panel to tell you of a recent installation at Buffalo Westinghouse Electric Corporation.

Recently we have completed a closed circuit television system to aid in policing a combined parking area, driveways and fence lines covering approximately 60 acres or parking room for about 6,000 cars. This was accomplished after about three years of investigation to obtain proper camera or cameras and lenses as well as correct location or locations.

At the present time a camera which is completely transistorized has been installed on a small building located on the roof of the plant and overlooking the parking area.

The camera is enclosed in a heavy-duty, all-weather case with necessary features such as cooling in summer and heating in winter.

A co-axial cable centered in a special cable containing 21 sets of control wire was carried a distance of 1820 feet to the Plant Protection Office, where suitable controls and monitor were installed, and of course, the monitor or receiver was a standard Westinghouse table model television set.

The remote control unit located in the Plant Protection Office permits the panning of the camera to a full 360 degree turn and not only provides surveillance of the parking area but a complete scanning of the roofs and other areas presenting a special fire hazard, such as lumber storage yard, box and crate buildings, and related areas.

It is also possible to tilt the camera to look up or down. The lens is an electrically controlled Zoomar lens giving broad angle viewing or close-ups. The focus of the camera, the opening or closing of the iris,

*(Continued on page 30)*

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


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

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## EMERGENCY HEADQUARTERS PLAN

## JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION

**By R. L. WHELAND**

The Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation's Emergency Disaster Program includes a plan to establish an Emergency Headquarters for the Corporation. An existing facility of the Corporation located more than thirty miles from a target center will be used.

The plan provides for nine emergency reporting centers surrounding the City of Pittsburgh. All General Office employees have been given a map showing them how to get to the Center closest to their home. The employees who will be available for work will report to the Centers as soon as possible following a disaster. As the need arises, these employees will be assigned to the Emergency Headquarters. Each Center is supplied with a special locked cabinet containing telephone books, personnel manuals, emergency payroll checks, instructions and other pertinent information.

In the same immediate area, a records storage vault has been constructed. The underground vault has 17,000 square feet of storage space and is constructed of reinforced concrete under approximately 150 feet of earth cover. The Records Retention Program specifies which vital and important records are to be microfilmed or duplicated and the length of time they should be retained in the vault. Facilities are located at the vault for reproducing usable prints from the microfilm records.

The By-Laws of the Corporation have been amended to provide a plan so in the event there is only one available member of the Board of Directors, he has the authority to fill vacancies in the Board of Directors and among the elected and appointed officers of the Corporation.

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**Frank S. Gallagher**

In an actual disaster or attack it may become necessary to evacuate personnel. This suggests a plan which spells out in detail the steps necessary for a successful evacuation, and is an indispensable part of a good emergency disaster plan. Consideration should also be given to periodic practice evacuations to test the workability of the evacuation plan. This is the real test of its effectiveness. In our organization we have perfected our evacuation exercise so that now it is accepted the same as fire drills. One of the reasons for its acceptance is that the trial run consumes but a few minutes. Most of you know how important this achievement is from the production point of view. It follows, of course, that any success is the result of cooperation of labor and management, who have acquired an understanding of the importance of these test exercises. Our emergency and disaster programming also provides for close cooperation with area C. D. officials and municipal authorities, police, fire, etc.

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**Harold Stout**

Midwest Research Institute has been cooperating with the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Battle Creek, Michigan, and with Consumers Power Company, Kansas City, Missouri, in field tests on our electric systems, exploring the technical feasibility of the National Emergency Alarm Repeater (NEAR) System as a means of providing disaster warnings to any residence or installation having electric service. It would appear that the NEAR System offers for the first time a really effective means of simultaneously alerting everybody. The method employs electric utility circuits for carrying the impulse signal. The warning device (Mr. Stout displayed the device to the audience), a small black box which may be plugged into any home or business electrical outlet, will be connected to the community's power system. When activated by a special signal through the main power lines the device gives a distinctive warning. The warning device can be triggered by state and local government officials in a matter of seconds after receiving warnings from the North American Air Defense Command. The alarm itself, designed for home installation, has no moving parts. Built into its mechanism is a ten-second delay element to protect against accidental sounding of the alarm caused by power surges, electrical storms and other mischance. The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization will conduct a test of this warning device in Charlotte, Michigan, on October 11. Approximately two thousand homes and business establishments will be equipped with the warning device on a test basis. We hope this emergency alarm receiver will prove to be the answer to the inside-the-home warning problem. It is simple and inexpensive.

# WORKSHOP NO. 7
# "DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE"

**PAUL HANSEN**
Reynolds Metals Company
Richmond, Virginia

**A. TYLER PORT**
Department of Defense

**GEORGE MacCLAIN**
Department of Defense

**CHESTER WEBB**
United States Air Force

**MAJOR JAMES D. MORAN**
United States Army

**GORDON PATTON**
United States Air Force

**GENE ELKINS**
United States Navy

**GILBERT DAVIS**
Department of Defense

By way of introduction of DOD participation in the ASIS Seminar, Mr. *A. Tyler Port*, Director, Office of Security Policy, OSD, stated that the greatest single problem we face in making sound security policy is that of communications, communications within and between government agencies, and communications between government and industry. He explained that it is not always easy to get new ideas across. In this connection, it is essential to know the precise details of the other person's problem and how he is going to react to the policy decisions being made. Reasons were outlined which make it impractical to canvass industry's views each time a change is contemplated in the Industrial Security Manual. Mr. Port thought it preferable that a flexible means be developed whereby the talents of representatives of industry can be applied in a continuous manner to assist in the resolution of specific problems of mutual concern to industry and government.

Mr. Port's main presentation concerned the subject of security in the field of international procurement. He outlined several basic problems which must be explored by government representatives before approval may be given to foreign procurement, such as whether: (1) The United States has a treaty or other arrangement with a foreign government which authorizes the release of classified information; (2) the security procedures of the foreign government are acceptable to the U. S.; (3) the U. S. has effected any sort of general or special agreement to insure the physical safeguarding of classified information; and (4) the proposed release to a foreign government or contractor is consistent with our national policy.

The application of the International Traffic-In-Arms Regulation, as amended 1 March 1960, was discussed, including the export controls relating to arms, ammunition and implements of war, including technical data. It was explained that this Regulation is a document with which every security officer in industry should be familiar. There can be no disclosure either oral or written of information falling under the Regulation without the prior approval of the Department of State. In addition to State Department approval, any potential disclosure which will include the release of classified defense information requires the authorization of the contracting military department.

Mr. Port next discussed NATO infrastructure procedures. The term "infrastructure" was defined as those projects that are jointly financed by NATO member nations and constructed for common use. The procedures for establishing a project were outlined from inception to ultimate consummation, including procedures under which U. S. industry may obtain bid information. Primarily, the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce, is responsible for informing U. S. business of opportunities abroad. Announcements are made by this activity to the daily press, or through the Foreign Commerce Weekly or trade associations. The procedures for advising a member NATO country of the security clearance status of a U. S. firm also were explained.

Mr. Port concluded his presentation with a discussion of NATO industrial security procedures. Through visual aids he explained how the security practices adopted in connection with the NATO procedures differ from those presently used by the Department of Defense in normal U. S. security operations. The procedures which must now be followed by U. S. contractors in performing on NATO contracts in the U. S. are set forth in Section XI of the Manual.

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*Mr. George MacClain*, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Industrial Personnel Access Authorization Review, discussed the recently published regulation which reactivated the personnel review aspects of the Department of Defense Industrial Security Program. With respect to the Supreme Court opinion in the case of *Greene* v. *McElroy*, June 29, 1959, Mr. MacClain distinguished the decision of the Court from its obiter dicta. He showed how the Executive Branch of the Government, in Executive Order 10865, dated February 20, 1960, complied with both the decision of the Court and with the spirit of its views as expressed in its dicta. With respect to the Industrial Personnel Access Authorization Review Regulation of the DOD, published July 28, 1960, he explained its terminology and summarized certain of its major aspects by which it implemented E. O. 10865. These points related to: (1) What informa-

*(Continued on next page)*

tion could be received and considered by the various Boards of the Review Program; (2) the extent to which "confrontation" by witnesses was required and not required; (3) the function and importance of the office of "department counsel" (not to be confused with the Office of General Counsel, OSD); (4) the new concept of personal appearance proceeding conducted by a Field Board, and the objective of constituting these Boards as single member examiners; (5) the nature of the Central Board, and the opportunity to be afforded for oral or written argument before it based upon its announced tentative determination; (6) the extent to which the "head of the department" was required to participate, and the legal significance of such participation; and (7) the express reservation in E. O. 10865 of the absolute unilateral authority of the "head of the department" to make final determinations without utilizing board procedures. With the aid of charts, Mr. MacClain showed how a case would be processed through the Review Program under the 1960 Review Regulation.

In closing, Mr. MacClain summarized certain aspects of the legal position of the Department with respect to the scope of the decision in *Greene* v. *McElroy*, and with respect to the standing of an individual to claim restitution of lost salary or earnings under the Review Regulation.

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*Mr. Chester Webb*, Assistant for Security, Office of Inspector General for Security, Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, discussed the new organization for industrial security in the Air Materiel Command. The new concept is designed to increase efficiency within the Command by: (1) Reducing the number of overhead personnel; (2) reducing administrative costs; and (3) establishing direct channels of communications. The number of cognizant security offices has been cut from 50 to 3 Contract Managment Regions located as follows:

Eastern Region — Olmstead Air Force Base, Pennsylvania

Central Region — Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

Western Region — Mira Loma, California

Each of these offices has field personnel located within the respective Regions who will make the required security inspection of facilities and will furnish contractors advice and guidance on security matters. It was noted that during the period of changeover, delays have not occurred in the processing of personnel security clearances of contractors' employees. As of the present time, all offices are current in processing such clearances.

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*Major James D. Moran*, Senior Instructor, U. S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, discussed the revised Security Requirements Check List (DD Form 254). The objective of the revised Check List, released as an appendix of the 1 June 1960 edition of the Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information, is the timely identification of the information that requires a security classification and a simultaneous determination of the lowest acceptable level of classification. In the selection of security classifications, the lowest category consistent with security requirements should be assigned. The DD Form 254, or classification specification, is to be utilized by activities of the DOD to identify and indicate to contractors the classified information involved in prime and/or subcontracts. The Check List furnishes the basis by which the contractors can determine the security categories of the information, the volume of information his personnel will handle, the type and amount of storage and other safeguarding devices that will be required and the number of his personnel who are to be afforded access authorizations. The premise upon which the revised classification specification has been developed is that the information, not the media or hardware, is to be properly safeguarded. The new 254 furnishes guidance as to the "Why" of classification. The DOD firmly believes that once the basic reason for a security classification has been established and made explicit and the contractor is furnished the knowledge of why the information is to be protected, it will be easier to apply the procedures governing the safeguarding, dissemination, declassification, and other security operations. It is this concept of classifying information, relying upon the judgment of knowledgeable individuals, which will speed the achievement of an efficient and economical Industrial Security Program.

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*Mr. A. Gordon Patton*, Assistant Chief, Industrial Security Division, Office of the Provost Marshal, Department of the Air Force, discussed paragraph 5n of the Industrial Security Manual, pertaining to the publication and distribution of classified brochures.

He stated that classified brochures fall within two general classes: (1) Those prepared by a contractor to serve primarily a company purpose; and (2) those prepared at the specific request of a DOD activity to serve a contractural or other official purpose.

He noted that the prohibition outlined in paragraph 5n is designed to cover the first class of brochures, and that the purpose of his talk was to distinguish between these two classes.

He stated that in preparing sales material for solicitation, promotional or background material, the primary rule should be to avoid inclusion of classified information. In the exceptional instance when the use of classified information cannot be avoided, the contractor must obtain approval from the contracting officer, both for the inclusion of classified information and for the distribution list of the brochure involved.

He advised that these restrictions are not applicable with regard to a reply to a request for proposal or in-

*(Continued on page 34)*




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vitation to bid received by a contractor from a contracting activity of DOD.

There are also other cases to which the requirements of 5n are not applicable, such as (1) classified information which may be prepared in the form of a brochure but which is published for use solely within the contractor's organization, or his subcontractors in the performance of the contract; and (2) classified information which is prepared in response to a formal request of the DOD.

It is stressed, however, that the exceptions referred to would apply only if the classified information involved was obtained *from* the contracting military department concerned. Otherwise, permission must be obtained from the appropriate contracting officer.

Although the question of classified information, per se, was not involved, a collateral problem frequently is raised pertaining to paragraph 5m. That paragraph provides, in part, that the contractor "shall not release, *for public dissemination*, information pertaining to classified contracts or projects except after clearance by the Office of Security Review, Office of the Secretary of Defense . . ." The purpose of this paragraph is to require the contractor to obtain approval for release to *the general public* of information pertaining to classified contracts and to insure that he is not inadvertently disclosing classified information in such releases. Public dissemination, as used here, means disclosure of information through news releases, radio, television, periodicals, and any other media whereby the information is freely available to the public at large.

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*Mr. Eugene Elkins*, Industrial Security Administrator, Office, Supervising Inspector of Naval Material, Southeastern District, Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, discussed industrial espionage activities conducted by the Communists and other unfriendly regimes. This effort is aimed not only at classified information but also at gathering economic and technical information of every kind and description. Department of Defense Industrial Security Letter No. 60-5, dealing with industrial security and Soviet espionage, was referred to as furnishing the background information on the use of intelligence information and identifying the various activities in this country which are collecting such data for the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's analysis of the problem was quoted as follows:

> "The security of our nation—indeed, the safety and freedom of each American—rests in the hands of those who are in possession of any information which might be helpful to an enemy. It is an indisputable fact that Communist-directed espionage activity exists on a massive world-wide front. There has been no cessation of such activity in the United States. On the contrary, our military, scientific and industrial secrets have been and continue to be targets on which a veritable army of espionage agents have focused their efforts. What type of data do these agents seek? The answer is: anything and everything. It is a fact that the intelligence objectives of the Communist-bloc countries can properly be described as all-encompassing. The Soviet-bloc espionage apparatus seeks political, scientific, economic, cultural and military information of all types.
>
> "There is every indication that foreign directed espionage activity will be continued on an increasing scale for an indefinite period in the future. Every American citizen should be aware of this and be on guard."

Mr. Elkins discussed questionnaires as a form of correspondence. It was noted that such inquiries should be treated with particular caution, because they are carefully tailored to meet the specific needs of the requester. Procedures to be followed in determining whether the questionnaire should be answered were suggested. Questionnaires submitted or sponsored by the Federal Government should be complied with. Questionnaires from other sources, such as trade, business, or other groups, should be analyzed to determine what is known about the organization; whether the information is available from public sources; and if the public and the company will benefit by furnishing the information. If doubt exists regarding the accruing benefits or the possibility of the information being misused, it was suggested that management consult with its cognizant security office prior to furnishing the requested information. It was explained that the public must be kept informed of all matters consistent with the interest of national security. It is not the intent of the Department of Defense to impose any degree of censorship upon releases by contractors in the field of unclassified information. It was pointed out, however, that the application of reasonable discretion can serve the national interest on the one hand and at the same time defeat the collection efforts of our enemies. It is to this end that the cooperation of industry is solicited.

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*Mr. G. H. Davis*, Program Coordinator, Office of Security Policy, OSD, presented a summary of the changes to the Industrial Security Manual. In his discussion, he briefly outlined the reasons behind several of the changes. He also outlined the operating procedures provided for under the U. S.-Canada Industrial Security Agreement. These procedures are actually composed of six separate sections: (1) Placement of Canadian contracts within the United States; (2) placement of U. S. contracts in Canada; (3) clearances of Canadian-owned facilities in the U. S.; (4) clearances of U. S.-owned facilities in Canada; (5) clearances of Canadian citizens in the U. S.; and (6) clearances of U. S. citizens in Canada. Each of these procedures was discussed in detail.

# WORKSHOP NO. 8
# "SECURITY PROBLEMS IN RETAIL BUSINESS"

Presiding:

**JOHN M. FISHER**
Sears, Roebuck and Company
Chicago, Illinois

Panel Participants:

**ROBERT J. KELLEY**
Neiman-Marcus Company
Dallas, Texas

**PAUL B. CHAPMAN**
Sears, Roebuck and Company
Dallas, Texas

**O. A. JONES, Captain**
Forgery Bureau
Dallas Police Department

**M. W. STEVENSON, Deputy Chief**
Criminal Investigating Division
Dallas Police Department

## BURGLARY AND SHOPLIFTING AS RELATED TO RETAIL BUSINESS

**By M. W. STEVENSON**

The responsibility of the security officer in regards to burglary is primarily prevention. He should concentrate on making it as difficult as possible for the burglar to obtain entry. When the burglar knows a building is properly secured he is to a great extent discouraged from attempting entry. Points to keep in mind:

Be sure doors and windows are securely locked.

Leave sufficient light burning at night.

Check interior and exterior of building when closing.

If vacant building adjoins check to see if it is properly secured.

Designate this responsibility to one man.

*FOUR TYPES OF SHOPLIFTERS:*

1. Professional
   a. Responsible for our heaviest losses and the one to watch for.
   b. Steal to sell—it is their livelihood.
   c. Seldom work alone—usually two or more with one waiting in car.
   d. Use many different methods: Booster bloomers, gathered skirt, shopping bags, handbags, trap boxes, etc.
   e. May operate with small children or baby in arms.
   f. In most instances are careful to steal articles valued under $50.00—a misdemeanor in Texas.
2. Narcotic Addict
   a. Steals to sell to obtain money to support habit.
   b. Differs from professional in that will steal anything, anywhere.
   c. Usually more bold or careless in committing thefts.
   d. More likely to give trouble when apprehended.
3. Novice and/or Juvenile
   a. Minor offendors, easily apprehended, do not steal to sell.
4. Kleptomaniac
   a. One with uncontrollable desire to steal.
   b. Usually steals articles of little or no particular value.

*PREVENTION — POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED*

1. Arrangement of fixtures.
2. General layout of store.
3. Lighting—no dark or hidden corners.
4. Avoid high bulky displays as they provide cover for shoplifters.
5. Special attention to entrance and exits.
6. Training of employees in what to watch for and what to do when shoplifter observed at work.

*PROSECUTE* The best deterrent to any criminal is fear of apprehension and certainty of punishment.

## ACCIDENT PREVENTION RETAIL DEPARTMENT STORES

**By PAUL B. CHAPMAN**

Security has been defined as "Freedom from exposure to danger; protection; safety or a place of safety." Therefore, one of the major functions and responsibilities of security personnel is to prepare and administer a program which will prevent injuries to our customers and employees. The size of your organization, or whether you are self-insured or insured by an outside carrier, does not lessen the costs of accidents or the adverse effects accidents have upon the functioning of your company.

The success of every accident prevention program depends upon how well it is sold to the employees at all levels of your company. We must begin our selling job at the top management level, for without their understanding and support, very little can be accomplished.

Our first step is to prepare a statistical analysis of the information contained in the accident records. With this information you can intelligently discuss the costs and causes of accidents with management. A personal interview with management is essential. I am opposed to sending lengthy detailed reports to those executives who hold positions such as President, Vice President, Chairman of the Board, etc. They have neither the time for, nor the interest in, wading through a fifty-page report. These executives recognize the fact that accidents have a direct effect

*(Continued on next page)*

on the profits of the company. It is our responsibility to keep them informed of the nature and extent of these losses. Management is then in a position to formulate and publish company policies regarding the prevention and handling of accidents. A case in point occurred recently when a Territorial Vice President reviewed this type of summary, and he agreed that a letter should be written to each of his Store Managers, advising them of the seriousness and scope of accidents in their units. He urged each Store Manager to form a safety committee in his unit and make a periodic analysis of the accidents which occurred there.

It is preferable to meet personally with Store Managers. This is not always possible because of the number of stores and the size of a region to be covered. In any event, a Store Manager must be convinced his own unit is incurring losses which could be prevented. It is up to him to select a person to administer a safety program. It is most logical for the Security Manager to be called upon for this assignment because his duties require him to be in contact with every office and department daily. The chairman of the safety committee must be able to lead and have all of the qualities of a good salesman. The safety committee should make surveys, review accident records, and report hazardous conditions and equipment to the Store Manager. The Accident Prevention Check List and the Accident Hazard Notice are used by safety committees at Sears. The latter is filled out in duplicate by the safety committee member; the original is given to the Department Manager, and the duplicate copy is forwarded to the Store Manager. After the condition has been corrected, the Department Manager sends his copy to the Store Manager indicating what action has been taken.

The most difficult task for a Safety Director is maintaining employees' interest. This is the area in which his ability as a salesman is most important. There are several methods of keeping employees accident conscious, but each one is limited in its effect. These include statistical reports, graphs, safety posters, movie films, pamphlets, badges, flags, etc. Statistical reports are of little interest to the average employee. Commercial safety posters must be chosen with care to assure they are both appropriate and interesting. Posters should be placed in strategic areas and changed frequently. Local safety posters are particularly interesting to employees when photographs are used. Pictures of local accident hazards, using store personnel as models, will bring about discussions among employees. Safety films have been most effective when they are made a part of the orientation course for new employees. The operating and merchandising departments use movies as training aids on numerous occasions. It is sometimes difficult to convince management each employee should see a film because of the payroll cost factor. Approval may be obtained if it is suggested the film be shown to several groups rather than the entire number of employees at the same time. Safety pamphlets, payroll inserts, badges, and flags are a few examples of the many articles which are used to maintain interest in a safety program. One of the obstacles in planning a safety program is its cost. For example, a 16 MM sound film can be purchased for approximately $85.00. Conversely, it would cost $1,600.00 to give one pamphlet to each of the employees in my territory. I think you will agree a movie has a greater impact and a more lasting effect than does a pamphlet.

There is no substitute for personal contact with your employees. Accident prevention should be discussed with your people at every possible opportunity. This includes general store meetings, department manager meetings and staff meetings. Visual aids should be used whenever possible.

Contests are frequently associated with the safety program. Elaborate contests are expensive; local ingenuity and enthusiasm can be used in place of expensive materials. Our employees are exposed to numerous contests during the year, and time is another feature to be considered if a contest is to be scheduled.

In your daily contact with employees, many will ask why they should participate in a safety program, or as they express it more bluntly, "What's in it for me?" My reply to this question is another question, "What can you afford to lose?" Almost every company provides complete medical care for employees who are injured on the job as well as full compensation for at least a part of the period of disability. Therefore, the answer to the employee must be on a more personal basis. The pain and suffering of an injury are not readily understandable, but the future effects on the employee and his family can be comprehended. This would include, for example, the loss of his ability to bowl, golf, hunt, fish, or whatever his pastime may be. His future earning power may be substantially reduced because of a disabling injury. This not only affects his own life, but it also affects his ability to provide for his family, i.e., food, housing, education, etc.

In closing, may I emphasize the responsibility for the prevention of disabling injuries and the reduction of losses of profit dollars is yours. It is your job to show the employees of your company there is a need for adequate training, a need for routine inspections, and a need for a strict policy of good housekeeping. These are also the basic requirements for good merchandising. If these requirements are met, the profits of the company will be secure, and your buildings will be ". . . free from exposure to danger, safe, or a place of safety."

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## FORGERIES, FRAUDS AND WORTHLESS CHECKS AS THEY APPLY TO RETAIL STORES

By O. A. JONES

Although it has been said, and many security officers believe, that management is on one side; law enforcement on the other, and the security officer is left in the middle, there is really no conflict in the

objectives of all three groups. The management team is made up of good citizens who believe in enforcement of the law. They also want to reduce the loss of the company. Members of law enforcement groups believe in apprehending the violators of the criminal laws of this country and in preventing loss due to these violations as well as recovering, insofar as possible, merchandise and cash taken as a result of illegal acts.

We will take the theme of "IDENTIFICATION" as the primary subject in all three categories of our discussion. Adequate identification obtained at the time of the transaction means positive identification following apprehension.

I. Identification.
   A. Require identification in all cases unless passer is known personally.
      1. Make notation of type of identification used.
      2. Compare description on identification with person cashing check.
      3. Compare writing on identification with writing of person cashing check.
   B. Make notation of any physical mark or personal peculiarity or characteristic that would enable an identification to be made at some time in the future.
   C. When possible, obtain license number and description of car used by person cashing check.

II. Second party and out-of-state checks.
   A. Second party checks.
      1. The store has only a civil claim against party cashing check.
      2. The party cashing or passing the check has civil and criminal charges or claims against the maker of the check.
   B. Out-of-state checks.
      1. Local authorities will not always pay expenses of witnesses on out-of-state checks. Witnesses cannot be forced to come across state lines to appear in court.
      2. Forgeries on the face of instruments introduced into interstate commerce come under jurisdiction of FBI.
      3. Merchants cash these checks, in many instances, at their own risk; consequently, *positive* identification should be obtained.

III. Payroll checks. These are two party checks and particular attention should be paid to payroll checks when they are rubber stamped or typed, rather than printed type checks.

IV. Conclusion: It is almost impossible to obtain a conviction on a criminal charge involving fraudulent checks, without an eyewitness, *POSITIVE* identification.


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


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# WORKSHOP NO. 9
# "CONTROLLING SECURITY COSTS"

Presiding:

**BERT D. INMAN**
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
San Francisco, California

Panel Participants:

**ALFRED P. ASHTON**
Institute for Cooperative Research
The Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

**DONALD C. GEARHART**
General Electric Company
Santa Barbara, California

**CHARLES E. HAYDEN**
Philco Corporation
Palo Alto, California

**LAWRENCE M. TAYLOR**
The Ralph M. Parsons Company
Los Angeles, California

## "CONTROLLING SECURITY COSTS"
## OBJECTIVE: TO ATTAIN MAXIMUM SECURITY AT A MINIMUM COST

**By BERT D. INMAN**

It can be said, I am sure, that after our Panel Participants pointed out those areas where saving could be effected in Security cost, whether the Contract was one of Research, Research and Development, or Manufacture, a feeling seemed to exist "that even with maximum cost, maximum security might be difficult to attain, because of the human element involved, when dealing with Security matters."

To obtain a more logical approach, some conclusions could be drawn from the Discussion Period—that

a. Responsibility for checking, regulating or controlling Security cost should be borne equally by both Government and Industry.

b. Industrial Security Representatives from both Government and Industry should become more familiar with Security Clauses of the ASPRs.

c. To overcome the difficult problem in controlling Security costs, the particular Security requirements should be considered at the time of Contract negotiations, not after — this to be accomplished by a closer relationship between the Contract Negotiators and the Security Representative of Government and Industry.

d. Definitely, the Industrial Security Representative should be at Management level. But before this can be achieved, he must increase his knowledge by learning and understanding Management's responsibilities and the various segments that constitute the overall operation of a Company. He cannot attain this level by being interested in Security alone.

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## "CONTROLLING SECURITY COSTS"

**By ALFRED P. ASHTON**

Checking, regulating or controlling Security Costs can be best accomplished *before* the award of a classified contract. The responsibility for same rests equally on the shoulders of industry and government, due to the oft-mentioned partnership arrangement which comes into existence under classified contracts.

Many contract clauses in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations can be included in classified contracts to more clearly identify the Security Costs to be charged *directly* or *indirectly* under a specific contract. Industrial Security representatives of industry and government should become more familiar with such clauses and recommend insertion of applicable ones in contracts.

The Industrial Security representative in government and in industry should "sit" with his procurement people and recommend a particular type of security program for each particular procurement bid or quotation. The Security Costs to be charged directly or indirectly should also be discussed and agreed upon. All such activities should occur *before negotiation* for a contract commences and then, when the negotiators for each of the contracting parties "sit across the table," a clear and definite understanding of the responsibilities and obligations of a security program, as well as the costs of such program, can be agreed to *before* the operating contract is executed and awarded. Waiting until after the award and execution of a contract brings lack of understanding, increased security costs, chaos and confusion.

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## CONTROLLING SECURITY COSTS IN A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

**By DONALD C. GEARHART**

It would appear that the topic assigned to me is a timely one in view of the many cut-backs that the defense industry suffered in recent months. With the day of the lean budgets upon us, it behooves the

Security Administrator in industry to make critical review of his security program to insure that his overhead type of operation is not adversely affecting the company's profit position.

In a non-hardware type research and development organization there are many ways to economize in the administration of a security program and still realize the maximum effectiveness in all areas of operation.

Since we are dealing here with a strictly "idea-mill" operation it becomes immediately obvious that our prime area of concern from a security standpoint is providing protection for and absolute accountability of the many thousands of pieces of classified paper that record the concepts generated yearly in this type of organization. In any such organization paperwork becomes the life-blood of the operation.

A simple log-book system will prove adequate in the first period of growth. However, a long-range goal of ultimately converting to a machine-type accountability system or a more sophisticated multi-part paper form control system must be kept in mind at all times in developing an accountability system through its various stages of growth until it is eventually mechanized. The Security Administrator will necessarily have to consider all of the aspects of a mechanized system at the time that he is designing his simple log-book controls. By this I mean that the operator of a machine-card punch machine should be able to read from the log-book or card control entries such items as security classification, document number, copy number, present location, custodian, and disposition and so forth, and at the same time machine-punch the new IBM card without having to search out the pertinent information. If this one factor of document control system design is kept in mind from the inception of the first phase of the system, considerable time and expense will be ultimately saved in converting the system from a log-book or multiple-card system to an IBM punched card system.

An economical and highly efficient interim accountability system can be realized by the use of a manual-type punched card system such as that manufactured by the McBee organization. This system utilizes hand-punched holes to provide for such accountability items as those just mentioned. The McBee or comparable system becomes rather cumbersome when any great volume of documents are placed in the system. Experience has shown that this type system ceases to be really effective when the number of documents reaches 8,000 to 10,000. The next stage of growth in a document accountability system would be conversion to a machine-type punched card operation.

Most research and development organizations need a computer for technical and scientific purposes sometime after the first year of operation. This seems to tie in naturally with the stage of growth of the firm's document accountability system at the point where it becomes necessary and desirable to convert the manual-type accountability system to a machine-type system. By placing the document accountability system on the machines at this point, a dual dollar savings will be realized—first from the operating efficiency to be gained in mechanizing the accountability system, and second from gaining more productive machine time.

The Security Administrator today must constantly keep in mind and search for new and different ways to control and reduce costs in the physical security and personnel security areas of his operation as well as the information control function. In the area of physical security serious consideration should be given to the economic factors involved in utilizing contract service guard force versus a company employee guard force. Substantial savings can many times be realized by using contract service. In the area of personnel security, more specifically security education, the purchase of security movies produced by other companies and being placed on the mailing list for security education posters and hand-outs generated from other industrial firms at no charge should be considered as another method to reduce costs in the security area.

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## CONTROLLING SECURITY COSTS WHERE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ARE COMBINED WITH LIMITED PRODUCTION

By CHARLES E. HAYDEN

We assume that the person responsible for plant protection, safeguarding classified defense information, personnel clearances, fire prevention and safety of a facility must have, within the scope of his responsibility, the authority to perform the management functions of leading, planning, organizing and controlling, and that the problems are complicated by unusually rapid growth.

Since guards' salaries comprise the largest element of security cost, effective cost control requires that guard manpower be utilized in such a way that we eliminate overlapping shifts, posts that do not serve plant operations effectively, excess supervisory positions, etc. Modern technology provides us with such devices as closed-circuit television, remotely controlled locks, electronic detection devices, etc., which, under proper conditions, can greatly extend or multiply the posts that a guard can control. Close coordination and cooperation with your plant engineering people can do much to devise money-saving arrangements.

Properly prepared DD Forms 254 - Security Requirements Check Lists - supported by an aggressive program of continuous review and downgrading of

*(Continued on next page)*

classified material can do much to keep down the costs connected with handling and storing classified material.

The scope of personnel investigation can be broadened, but kept within a reasonable budget, through the use of carefully prepared letters, with a telephone or face-to-face follow-up on doubtful or derogatory replies.

In-plant fire brigades, carefully placed hose connections and other relatively low-cost devices may be acceptable and effective substitutes for more costly automatic extinguishing systems in buildings held under short term lease.

We have found that injury prevention can be effective when made the responsibility of every supervisor under the direction of the safety officer.

In most firms, a considerable capability for prevention and survival of disaster can be developed at minimum expense by training elements of the existing management, maintenance and security organizations. The time spent in training is costly, therefore, all training, including security and safety education, should be well planned and effectively presented.

The responsibility for controlling security costs imposes upon us the obligation to analyze the expenditure before we suggest or approve it to determine that it will support the company's objectives and policies and provide improved security; that it does not overlap or duplicate or conflict with measures already in effect and that it will achieve better results than the available alternatives. However, control of costs does not mean, per se, reduction of cost. In security, as in most other things, cheapness and economy are seldom synonymous.

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## SECURITY COST CONTROL
## IN THE MANUFACTURE OF CLASSIFIED HARDWARE

**By L. M. TAYLOR**

Adequate security will cost you money! You can't buy effective security with money alone! But, dollars you spend for unnecessary precautions, excess personnel, wasteful practices, and time consuming procedures will only hamstring your primary effort—to safeguard classified material. You must program and segregate areas—classified from unclassified.

You must have a trained and dedicated Industrial Security Administrator, with full authority, who will have complete cooperation and backing of management.

All personnel responsible for the contract and classified material must understand the Security Requirement Check List (DD Form 254) before starting work on the contract.

To properly identify and segregate those who have a "need to know," an alert Security Administrator must thoroughly understand, either personally or through his subordinates, the duties discharged by each and every employee on the performance of a classified contract.

After you have properly investigated and screened those employees who will have access to classified information and/or material, you must establish written controls for classified documents and material. And, Gentlemen, if you do not have a good log and receipt control, you do not have adequate security! INSTALL A MASTER LOG AND MAINTAIN IT RELIGIOUSLY!

The Department of Defense, I think, has given the contractor sufficient information in its Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information (attachment to DD Form 441). But, a contractor must provide suitable protective measures within his facility for the safeguarding of classified information or material.

Only *clear* the personnel who will have a "need to know" on the contract, and indoctrinate them.

Downgrade your material (drawings and reports), so it can be used in unclassified areas. Do not isolate large areas when you will only need small ones!

If you have properly broken down the 254 schedule and the drawings, you will not have to concern yourselves with the machine shop or the sheet metal shop, because you will have properly segregated those areas. Experience has also taught that not everyone in the electrical shop, electronics shop, or assembly areas need be cleared, if you can segregate your operations. Here, again, the Government is asking you to have control over the personnel that "need to have access."

In our vast missile program, the primary concern is not *what* you are making—but what it is for, and what it does. Remember—where there is testing to be done, the testing data almost certainly falls into a classified status. Be sure that this information is properly protected at all times!

Plan an economical program that will provide the proper protection needed, at a minimum cost to your company. No longer can a Security Administrator expect to properly fulfill his obligations if he has not taken effective steps to plan an economical program of Industrial Security for his company.



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


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# WORKSHOP NO. 10

# "FIRE PREVENTION"

Presiding:

**HAROLD L. FOSTER**
Division of Fire Prevention
Department of Public Safety
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky

Panel Participants:

**JOHN S. CHAPMAN**
The Fyr-Fyter Company
Dayton, Ohio

**ROBERT F. HAMM**
Indiana Rating Bureau
Indianapolis, Indiana

**L. J. DONNELL**
Chance Vought Aircraft, Incorporated
Dallas, Texas

**J. K. MALLARD**
Chance Vought Aircraft, Incorporated
Dallas, Texas

Participating in the Workshop on October 5th was Mr. John S. Chapman, Educational Director from the Fyr-Fyter Company. Mr. Chapman's talk was HOW CAN LIVES AND PROPERTY BE PROTECTED FROM THE MENACE OF FIRE.

Judging from the reception given to Mr. Chapman's talk, it was a consensus of opinion that our efforts to secure his participation in the Workshop were well worth every effort extended.

Second to appear on the program was a demonstration and discussion in relation to flammable liquids and dust hazards. This was given by the boys from the Chance Vought Aircraft, Incorporated.

The advanced publicity given to these boys was certainly well-deserved. Theirs was one of the most interesting demonstrations that had been my pleasure to witness. Their program embodied not only an educational value, but was very entertaining as well.

Our third participant on the program was Mr. Robert Hamm, Director of Public Relations, Indiana Rating Bureau, Indianapolis, Indiana. Mr. Hamm's talk was THE IMPORTANCE OF INDUSTRIAL FIRE SAFETY.

Although Mr. Hamm has been very active in the fields of fire prevention and protection, and has appeared before many, many groups, he, as usual, presented a very timely message in an unique, yet impressive manner.

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## EFFECTIVE TRAINING REDUCES FIRE LOSSES

**By FIRE CHIEF J. M. CROWE**

A little matter of necessity—a need for "something" to train employees in the hazards of working with modern-day materials—has grown into a Chemistry of Fire demonstration at Chance Vought that today is worth many times over in value the money that it cost to develop.

Large numbers of employees in the aircraft industry are required to handle hazardous materials. We have found that it makes very little impression merely to tell them the materials they work with can be dangerous. Coupled with this, it has been estimated that 90 per cent of fires and explosions resulting from the use and handling of flammable liquids was the result of human error.

It is axiomatic that proper training of individuals handling flammable liquids would greatly reduce the number of accidents.

Presentation of the demonstration, the equipment for which largely was developed and fabricated in Vought's Shops, requires about 45 minutes and is composed of three parts.

The first part demonstrates the characteristics of the vapors of flammable liquids, how they burn and explode, and how fire travels through them. The conditions required to cause a fire are demonstrated and also how such conditions may be prevented.

The second part of the demonstration illustrates the various sources of ignition that start fires and cause explosions when combustible vapors are present. The means of preventing these sources of ignition are pointed out.

The third part demonstrates the various methods of extinguishing Class B fires.

*(Continued on next page)*

In connection with the characteristics of flammable liquid vapors, some of the demonstrations are:

1. Two drops of gasoline are exploded in a tube. The potential force of one gallon of gasoline is discussed.

2. A ten-thousand volt electric arc is drawn over the surface of gasoline to illustrate that it is not the liquid that burns. The arc is raised into the vapor just above the liquid to illustrate that even the vapor will not burn unless mixed with air in the proper proportion. When the arc is raised to the top of the beaker, where air and vapor are mixed, then fire is the immediate result.

3. Heating of sawdust in a glass flask with the vapors being ignited at the top of the flask proves that even when wood burns it is the vapor which burns.

4. Next the triangle of fire is discussed. Heat, fuel and oxygen.

5. Dangers incident to transferring gasoline, thinner and the like on the inside of a building is illustrated by using a tank transfer set-up.

6. The danger of vapors collecting in low places is illustrated by the vapors collecting in a beaker while the gasoline is being transferred. The danger of vapors traveling long distances on the floor or ground is demonstrated by using a vapor tube and candle. This phase of the demonstration also illustrates the danger of using even comparatively high flash point liquids such as kerosene, sovasol and high flash point napthas. The point is brought home by pouring sovasol in a beaker and extinguishing a lighted match in the solution, demonstrating that this happens only because the liquid is not heated to its flash point of around 110° F. Then a piece of aluminum is dipped into the sovasol and a lighted match is held under it. In a few seconds the sovasol on the aluminum ignites and burns freely. This illustrates that when the flame of the match brings the liquid to its flash point the released vapors will burn. A beaker of sovasol then is heated over a burner and the vapors above it are ignited by a spark. This illustrates that when a container of this type of liquid is heated by fire or other means it becomes just as dangerous as gasoline.

7. The danger of explosion in gasoline tanks or other containers is shown by using a small tank in which an explosion is created.

8. The even greater danger of jet fuel is illustrated by using an identical tank.

9. Another demonstration utilizes two drops of gasoline exploded in a tube charged with pure oxygen. This illustrates that fires and explosions are much more violent in the presence of pure oxygen.

The second part of the demonstration, dealing with the sources of ignition, shows that when flammable liquids must be used, some vapors are going to be present in the air regardless of careful handling. Thus, we have the fuel and the oxygen; all that is needed to create fire or explosion is a source of ignition.

1. This demonstration includes static electricity as a source of ignition. This is shown by exploding a mixture of two drops of gasoline in oxygen in an explosion tube. Means of preventing static sparks are pointed out to the audience at this time.

2. Electric sparks as a source of ignition is demonstrated by using a large explosion chamber and charging it with propane gas. Various pieces of equipment are used in the chamber, such as an electric light bulb and switch operated by a plunger. This demonstrates the hazards of an ordinary electric switch in a combustible atmosphere.

3. An electric heating element also is used to show that only heat is required to cause ignition; that open flames or sparks are not necessary as long as the required amount of heat is present.

4. Also, an electric motor is used to demonstrate that the sparks from the brushes are a source of ignition. This serves to bring home why explosion proof switches and motors, underwriters approved, should always be used in a combustible atmosphere.

5. Even the use of a cigarette as a source of ignition is demonstrated by dropping a lighted cigarette down a tube charged with oxygen and a few drops of gasoline.

The third part of the Chemistry of Fire Demonstration deals with the principles of extinguishment.

First, emphasis is placed on the absolute necessity of calling the fire department in the event of fire, followed by action which the individual may take to stop the fire before it gets out of hand. This phase of the lecture and demonstration covers smothering, with appropriate illustrations, such as shutting off the supply of air or smothering with a fire extinguishing agent, fog or a fine spray of water, dry chemical and foam. Also, the hazards of dust are demonstrated by exploding wood and aluminum dust and flour in a dust explosion chamber.

While the primary purpose of the Chemistry of Fire Demonstration is for training of employees, this has also served as a good community relations vehicle for the company. Several years ago Chance Vought received a request from two of the service clubs in the Dallas area to put this demonstration on before their membership at noon luncheons. Requests then started coming in from volunteer fire groups in the smaller communities in the area, from civic groups, parent and teachers associations, schools and military installations.

Since 1953 the demonstration has been given outside of the plant on more than 350 occasions to audiences totalling more than 31,000 people. The demonstration has been taken as far away as New

*(Continued on next page)*

**Workshop No. 10** ***(Continued)***

Orleans, Louisiana, where it was presented to personnel of the 8th Naval District Headquarters. Another large military installation where this demonstration has been given is Carswell Air Force Base, in Fort Worth, Texas.

When the demonstration is given to outside groups it is generally varied to fit the needs of the particular group. When it is given to the Dads Club, or a church group, for instance, demonstrations are given pointing to the fire hazards incident to the kitchen or the garage at home.

There is no difficulty in holding the attention of a group because of the varied and exciting type of demonstrations. Explosions or fires, of course, always illustrate a particular type of hazard.

The Chance Vought Fire Department demonstrations are given by Captain Joe Donnel, Drill Master, and his assistant, Fireman Johnny Mallard. It is our belief that this type of training given to our employees has been largely responsible for minimizing the number of fires at our installation resulting from careless handling of inflammable liquids.

Thousands of gallons and sometimes tens of thousands of gallons of highly combustible liquids are handled daily at the plant. Not one serious fire has resulted therefrom. We believe that the comparatively small amount of money spent in developing the demonstration, plus the classroom hours devoted to this demonstration, has paid off many-fold through minimizing fires and assuring continuous paychecks for our employees and production for the company.

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

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

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# GUEST SPEAKERS
## 6th National Seminar ASIS

**Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, The Inspector General, United States Air Force.**

I am most happy and most privileged to be given this opportunity to participate with you, once again, in an annual Conference of the American Society for Industrial Security. This is because I have the utmost respect for the aims and objectives of ASIS, the highest admiration for the patriotic dedication which you bring to the security mission and a deep appreciation for the significant and vital contribution which you have made to the security of our Nation during these troubled days in which we live.

Now any individual who presumes to accept a speaking engagement hopes that he may say something interesting in order that he may hold attention, and if his subject be a serious one, as is mine, he hopes that he may say something constructive in order that he may be helpful. Well, I too, hope that I may say something interesting and constructive, but, I must confess, that as I stand here before you I am assailed by a feeling of humility and a sense of misgiving as I undertake to talk to you about a subject you all know and understand so well, the subject of Industrial Security. At a time like this, it is nice to know one is among friends, and I find consolation in the thought that the bonds of old friendships may permit me, as it were, with some impunity to beard the lion in his den.

As we gather here today we are met in the midst of the most dynamic era in military history. In recent days, man has pierced the sonic barrier, he has solved and harnessed the mystery of the atom, he is making gigantic strides into space, and he is even now probing further and further into the mysteries of the universe, hitherto denied to man since the beginning of time!

As we consider the evolution of weapons down through the ages we can see that, until very recently, progress has been exceedingly moderate and slow. For example, over a century and a half of fighting during the Crusades produced little significant weaponry development. Even the artillery that was used during the Revolutionary War was little improved in range and accuracy over the catapults of the Roman Legions. But in your time and mine, particularly in the last 15 years of technological break throughs, the almost incredible improvements in weapons which have occurred completely eclipse the sum total of all military gains made during the previous 6,000 years of recorded history.

This becomes clearly evident when we recall that since time immemorial man has been preoccupied with endeavoring to improve the two most important elements of a military arsenal, the most destructive force in a weapon and the most effective means of delivering that force. Today man has propelled himself to a high peak toward achieving that endeavor—the most destructive force in a weapon and the most effective means of delivering that force—as is evidenced in the existence of the atomic bomb, long range, high speed manned bombers and inter-continental ballistic missiles.

This is the kind of power which is possessed by your Department of Defense. This is the kind of power which is maintained in a constant state of combat readiness by your U. S. Air Force. But then, too, this is the kind of power which is possessed by your potential enemies, the Communist world. We

*(Continued on next page)*

must never forget we are vying for superior military preparedness with a formidable potential foe, one who has time and time again announced his intention to dominate the whole world by one means or another. Surely it is clear, isn't it, that the realities of modern warfare make it imperative that the U. S. develop and maintain a convincing, a decisive power for peace. And such a power for peace does exist today in the combined strength of your Army and Navy and Air Force; a power which together with that of our Allies is intended primarily to deter any aggressive minded enemy from launching an attack upon the free world; a power which, God willing, will carry us through to victory if deterrence fails and all out war should be thrust upon us.

As General Nathan F. Twining, retiring Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a few days ago in New York City before the National Security Industrial Association, "The kind of struggle we are in—a struggle not alone of power, but of faith and the rule of law against materialism and anarchy—makes no allowance for a graceful loser. Either we win or we are finished."

All of this means to me that the free world must be superior to the Communist Bloc in decisive military power. And in achieving this end no single weapon or type of weapon will suffice; nor does one service or one Nation stand alone. We need complementary weapons on land, at sea and in aero-space—a combination of forces designed specifically to provide the free world with the flexibility and varied capabilities which are required.

And we also need this. If these weapons systems are to be effective in either role—that of deterring war, or winning a war that might be thrust upon us—military secrets that are associated with them must be held secure.

Which brings me to you and the purpose of your society. Today, more than ever before, American industry is a full partner of the Department of Defense in developing and maintaining the adequate posture which is so vital to our continued freedom. We are dependent upon the industries and research institutions you represent not only for their scientific accomplishments, technological genius and incomparable production capacity but also, in great and vital measure for the protection of the security of the military establishment itself. This is so because reposing in your offices and plants and factories and in the minds of your people are not only vital technical data which must be denied to an enemy, but also much that is highly sensitive in military planning, programming, logistic and operational information —all of which is provided on a need-to-know, but necessarily fairly widespread basis to enable our industrial partner to function effectively. Industrial Security then, is in great measure military security, and these together are vital to our National Security.

Let us dwell for a moment on just one aspect of Industrial Security which I consider exceedingly important today—the why of security in military research and development.

The sensational, almost incredible achievements of research and development for military purposes in recent years have contributed immeasurably to the offensive and defensive strength of this country. When viewed in the *absolute* this represents a truly tremendous accomplishment. However, as I see it, the exploitable level of military research and development is only *relative*. The real measure of worth is found in the *comparative* position of military strength it places us in relationship to an enemy at any given time.

It is the relative factor of *time* which is of the essence, the time it takes the Soviet to neutralize or exceed our gains with developments or compensating adjustments of their own.

New military weapons follow a cycle from research and development through production and distribution to absorbtion in operational inventory and tactical utilization. A serious compromise of the properly classified aspects of the project in the research and development stage may result in a loss of nearly all its strategic or relative value. If the compromise occurs during the production phase the strategic loss is not as great, but is still very substantial. By the time the weapons reach the tactical units, security on remaining classified aspects is still important but a substantial lead time has already been gained, if no compromise has previously occurred.

Accelerated development has brought upon us a condition where yesterday's achievements are completely inadequate, where many of today's are already obsolescent, and where one of our main hopes for technological superiority lies in being able to conceal for a little while some of the advances we have programmed for tomorrow. Hence the need for security.

Today when weapons and delivery systems are fantastically more complex, sophisticated and efficient than ever before in history we must have a dynamic industrial security program, not just on an individual plant basis, but on an integrated and mutual support basis throughout all defense industry. ASIS, with its aims and objectives and industry-wide representation, can and does make a major contribution to the achievement of this end.

Consider this comparison: when the Wright Brothers were awarded a War Department contract for our first military airplane, they were handed a sheet of specifications which were quite straightforward and simple. It was specified that this airplane should be capable of sustained flight of one hour's duration at a speed of 40 miles an hour. There was to be a bonus for every mile this speed was exceeded, and a penalty for every mile it fell short. Among the specifications was the requirement that this aircraft had to be so

*(Continued on page 48)*

# How BLACK LIGHT trapped the BURGLARS!

( A TRUE CASE HISTORY )

NEEDING ADDITIONAL WAREHOUSE SPACE, A LARGE EASTERN ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY LEASED FACILITIES NEAR ITS MAIN PLANT. IN SPITE OF PERIODIC CHECKS, VALUABLE EQUIPMENT DISAPPEARED REGULARLY FROM STORAGE AREAS AND LOADING DOCKS.

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LOOKS LIKE PROFESSIONALS, JIM—BUT I'VE GOT AN IDEA THAT MAY STOP THEM!



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constructed that it could be dismounted and transported on an Army wagon—horse drawn, of course. How well they met the performance requirements is a matter of history, but consider the picture today in the ballistic missile business.

The Air Research and Development Command handles this business through its Ballistic Missiles Division. From this source we are getting the Atlas, Titan, Thor, Minuteman, and other missiles as well as space boosters. In running this business the Ballistic Missile Division is working with 200,000 separate business concerns throughout the nation.

History does not record that the Wright Brothers were much concerned with physical security or security of information. After all, the information was largely contained within their own minds, and in their day, our national survival did not depend on their production.

From this comparison between the dawn of military aviation and the requirements for aero-space weapons of today and tomorrow, it is clearly evident that we have a requirement for a dynamic, intelligent and integrated Industrial Security program.

The requirement for protecting military secrets is as old as warfare itself. The requirement for doing so today is clear and indisputable, not only because of the urgency of our times and the need for maintaining a superior military preparedness, but also because of the nature of the internal security threat which the Communist world has mounted against us. There is no need for me, before such a knowledgeable group as this, to dwell upon the extensive and persistent espionage activities of our Communist antagonists, nor upon the vast effort expended by Soviet representatives in overtly gathering significant intelligence data from public sources such as public news media. You are aware of this problem as am I. I mention this merely to bring into brief focus the fact that persons entrusted with classified information have a responsibility to the government, to their own honor and integrity and to the American people, not only to protect it from the spy and clandestine agent, but also to refrain from so handling classified information that through their contrivance or carelessness it finds its way into public print and then into Communist hands for less than the price of a good cigar.

This business of adjusting ourselves to continuing conflict is difficult, especially in the field of security. Past security practices were geared largely to emergency situations of short duration. Consequently public tolerance was not taxed too severely. And relief came with the termination of the emergency, when the need for special security measures disappeared. In our past security practices we have been habituated to wars with a perceptible beginning and end. But the conflict which Communism has pressed upon us goes on and on. Our present security measures were born of necessity because of this conflict. They were emergency measures adopted to cope with an emergency situation. But this conflict continues. It has no foreseeable end. Curiously enough, we face a sort of permanent emergency, and the emergency situation has endured so long it has become our normal way of life.

In this situation there is a tendency to become weary and unbelieving, because as a peace-loving Nation we find it difficult to comprehend a "war" or conflict of this kind. But if we should lapse into indifference or carelessness—we are indeed endangered.

There is little need to fear a let-down in their chosen fields among our scientists, engineers, technicians, and manufacturers who contribute so measurelessly to our defense. They are stimulated daily and pressed to greater enterprise by professional challenge and pride, by tangible result and by the justifiable expectation of reward and recognition. But the requirements of good security do not beckon to them with the same fascination. There are few if any standards of achievement by which to measure each day's performance. Security does not produce a tangible end product. As a matter of fact, security is not an end objective in itself. It merely characterizes something else. Consequently it does not have a built-in incentive such as other fields of endeavor. This incentive must be supplied by a constant awareness of the problem. It must be founded in a patriotic self-discipline. Security must find its inspiration, and its strength, in the will to prevail of the American people.

Which reminds me, in contemplating our relative overall posture with that of the Communist world, we should never become so enamored of technological developments and breath-taking new weapons that we lose sight of the most important element of national strength, the people themselves. As we the American people measure up to the challenge of today—so shall we win or lose.

At the time of the American Revolution, just as our Country was being born as a nation, a distinguished Englishman, Edward Gibbon, wrote a several-volume history entitled *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. In these luminous pages he traced centuries of Roman rule, and between these covers he described what is perhaps the greatest story ever told of these once-great people.

But history is not a set of books. History is human experience. It is people who live, who love, who fight, who aspire and who finally die. A set of books only records these things. And, may I presume to remind you that, like the Romans of old, we are living in the midst of great history in the making. We are participating in it and we are aiding in shaping its course. We do not hold with the Communist theory of historical determinism. We know that man by exercise of his free will determines the course of history. And, we must will it that our cause will be sustained in our conflict with the Communist cause.

*(Continued on page 50)*

# SWITCH OVER

## from doubtful security



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A combination lock or a bar and padlock do not make a security file. Herring-Hall-Marvin security cabinets are specially designed, built and test proven to provide protection for classified material as required by Executive Order No. 10501 and Department of Defense Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information—DD Form 441 dated June 1, 1959. These labelled security cabinets comply with Federal Specification AA-F-357b for Insuated Cabinets and Federal Specification AA-F-358b for Non-insulated Cabinets. Federal Specifications now require labels showing security classification on cabinets. Are the cabinets you are using labelled for security protection? These cabinets are on GSA Contract GS-00S-30999 and are available to all Government Agencies and contractors who are working on classified Government Contracts.

**Also Model No. SRF 60-5**




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Guest Speakers *(Continued)*

No matter what form the struggle takes, we must meet it with a more firm devotion to believe and a more dynamic dedication to course. This we must do, else some day, some place, some historian may well begin the narrative of the United States with the words "Once upon a time."

Ladies, and Gentlemen, the theme of your conference is "What Price Security?" All I can say is there is no dollar tag on our freedoms. To protect them we must pay the price of security in National dedication and eternal vigilance. To do otherwise means the extinction throughout the world of the human dignity and integrity to which our nation is dedicated. Therefore, I say to you today, Security is priceless. In your mission you must not fail.

---

# MANAGEMENT LOOKS AT SECURITY

**STANLEY MARCUS, President**

**Neiman-Marcus Co., Dallas and Houston**

When I was first asked to speak before the American Society for Industrial Security, I accepted with some reservation. I felt it might be a little pretentious of me to stand before the country's outstanding security leaders and discuss with them the subject with which they're most familiar.

But, inasmuch as security is a matter of the greatest interest to me—and to the management at Neiman-Marcus—and because we believe that good security is good business, I have prepared a few thoughts for discussion, as an officer of a store which I hope is known to most of you.

Before going any further, however, I'd like to take this opportunity to offer my congratulations to your splendid and rapidly growing organization. I have noted with great interest the progress this group has made since its establishment only a few years ago, and I would like to commend you for your worthwhile endeavors.

I'm certain the basic nature of our security problems at Neiman-Marcus is little different from that encountered anywhere else. We believe that security in business must begin with the proper understanding and respect of employees for regulations and procedures. And, we feel that management must provide these regulations and procedures.

Perhaps it would be helpful background for me to briefly outline the structure of the Neiman-Marcus Security organization so you may know the importance we place upon it.

When the Neiman-Marcus Company was founded in 1907 by my father and his sister, the problems of security were relatively small. The store was not large, consequently, there was very little danger of merchandise being pilfered. But, as the store grew, so did the number of its employees and customers. And, so did the security risks.

For a number of years, our Security Division was a part of our Superintendent's Office. But, we discovered this was an inadequate place for it to be. In many instances, security problems were temporarily shelved for the immediate attention of a leaky faucet or a burned out light bulb. And, so, five years ago, we decided to separate Security from the Superintendent's Office and to make it a department of its own with its own director and staff, responsible for all security problems in our downtown store, our Preston Center suburban store and for our service building.

Today, this staff numbers more than 30 men and women. It is one of the largest security departments in a retail store south of the Mason-Dixon Line. We have guards on duty at our two Dallas stores and service building as well as our Houston store 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

The responsibilities of the Security Division are many and varied. Primarily, we feel the Security Department must understand the purpose of the regulations which management has established and reflect this attitude to the other employees—that the Security Division is for their protection and benefit.

Our Security Director is responsible for the supervision of the entire division and serves as the liaison between Neiman-Marcus and the Secret Service, the Sheriff's Office, the District Attorney's Office, the FBI, and the City Police. He works directly with all of these offices in regard to charges brought as a result of fraud, theft, counterfeiting and forgery, and on external investigations which occur as a result of Neiman-Marcus investigations. He supervises the many guards and detectives who are permanent members of the Neiman-Marcus staff.

Now I know that most of you probably think that the nature of most of our security problems at Neiman-Marcus is mainly that of shoplifters. However,

*(Continued on page 52)*

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**ORAL:** console panel offers immediate audible signal upon receipt of incoming alarm. Guards call in by plugging portable phones into jacks at central points. Monitoring center can signal ahead with lights for guard to call in.

**PRINTED:** permanent printed record on tape of every signal transmitted by the system...with location and cause.




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shoplifters are only a minor factor in the overall security operation.

I thought it might be interesting if I read to you a typical day in the life of our Security Director at Neiman-Marcus. I think it will best illustrate the varied tasks that daily confront his division.

Here is his day:

8:30 a.m.—Arrival at Neiman-Marcus. Checks into office, checks night reports and corrects various situations.

9:05 a.m.—Investigates report that a customer is banging on the Ervay Street Door, wanting to be let in to shop. Director calms her down, secures salesperson to help her and allows customer to enter store before opening time. Accompanies customer to selling floor and remains for a few minutes to be certain both customer and salesperson are satisfied.

9:30 a.m.—Reports back to office to finish checking night reports.

10:15 a.m.—Checks salesperson handling early customer to be certain everything is all right.

10:30 a.m.—Holds conference with security staff regarding violations of the Advertising Department. Contacts Advertising Department and clears violation.

10:47 a.m.—Receives emergency telephone call from the Fourth Floor that a drunk man is attacking customers and salegirls. Hurries to Fourth Floor and removes suspect to City Jail.

11:30 a.m.—Returns to Office and dispatches investigators to supply protection for a fashion show at Empire Room of Statler Hilton Hotel, where $500,000 worth of jewelry will be shown. (Neiman-Marcus presents a weekly fashion show in the Empire Room)

11:50 a.m.—Receives emergency telephone call from the Second Floor that a customer has lost her purse. Hurries to Second Floor with woman investigator, and investigator finds purse in women's rest room after searching fitting rooms, etc.

12:30 noon—Returns to office and writes report of purse incident for Security files.

12:50 noon—Precious Jewelry Department calls to say suspicious looking man is loitering on the premises. Hurries to Department, investigates complaint and learns man is prominent customer waiting for his wife to come select a piece of jewelry.

1:15 p.m.—Returns to office. Receives call from Service Building that a suspicious looking car is following one of the Neiman-Marcus delivery trucks. Calls police for help, they dispatch squad car. Then, jumps into own car, since route is well-known to entire Security Division, and takes up chase. Finds truck pulled up alongside curb on Central Expressway and behind it the suspicious looking automobile, which actually was a detective squad clocking our truck at 75 miles-per-hour in a 50-mile zone. The detectives recognize Neiman-Marcus Security Director and ask his advice. He tells detectives to write a ticket against the driver.

2:30 p.m.—Returns to Neiman-Marcus and proceeds to employees' cafeteria for lunch. Just begins to eat when Preston Center suburban store calls to say that three shoplifters from Kansas City have been apprehended by store detectives. Leaves lunch and proceeds to Preston Center.

3:00 p.m.—Arrives at Preston Center, interrogates the three suspects and calls suburban police. The suspects are removed to the police station.

5:15 p.m.—Returns to downtown office and receives call from President of Company wanting to know the date of his speech for the ASIS Convention.

5:30 p.m.—Closes store and goes home.

6:00 p.m.—Arrives home, has dinner and watches television.

8:45 p.m.—Telephone rings. It is suburban police department requesting him to come to the station.

9:15 p.m.—Arrives at suburban police station—they have valuable information regarding the recovery of some stolen merchandise, which they were unable to give over the telephone.

11:00 p.m.—Arrives back home and retires for the night.

2:35 a.m.—Telephone rings. It is an electric protection company calling. A burglar alarm in the Neiman-Marcus Service Building has just sounded off, and the police have found two suspects hiding on the roof. Security Director says he will be there immediately.

2:50 a.m.—Departs for Service Building.

3:05 a.m.—Arrives Service Building. Police apprehend suspects. Director and police check building.

4:00 a.m.—Departs from Service Building.

4:20 a.m.—Arrives home.

6:00 a.m.—Alarm rings and another day begins.

As you can see, our Security Director is not simply a "floor-walker." He is an administrator, supervisor, ambassador of goodwill, investigator and super salesman.

Despite our large staff and the many security precautions we take, however, we still have many problems. Our store has been the scene of some of the

*(Continued on page 54)*

# AUTOCALL PLANT PROTECTION CONTROL CENTER monitors all critical locations —cuts security costs!

## Provides complete fire protection

An Autocall Proprietary System is engineered to provide your property with complete supervision and protection. The system funnels into the control center such vital information as automatic heat detection, waterflow in sprinkler systems, abnormal temperatures, pressures, liquid levels, valve closings, door openings and many other irregular conditions.

It supervises watch patrols, provides manual fire alarm and communicates with protection personnel through an Autocall Paging System.

Nerve ends are the detection devices with automatic code signaling transmitters. This code is instantly printed, in plain English, on the print recorder giving location, time and cause of the signal. No signal can be lost or confused because all signals are positive, non-interfering and successive.

The results . . . better protection and better supervision at greatly reduced costs in personnel. Your Autocall Sales-Engineer is ready to help you plan a new system or upgrade your present protection. Write, wire or phone:

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THE AUTOCALL COMPANY • SHELBY, OHIO • SALES OFFICES IN PRINCIPAL CITIES

worst pilferages in Dallas history. One of the largest rings of thieves composed of personnel in the store got away with more than a million dollars worth of merchandise before it was uncovered. And, we certainly have not been without embezzlers.

I recently read Norman Jaspan's book, *The Thief in the White Collar*, in which he estimates that employees of companies throughout the United States will steal more than $1 billion this year. This huge amount of pilferage is more than twice the amount stolen each year by all the Nation's professional thieves. Mr. Jaspan attributes this stealing by employees to neglect of their needs and morals and to poor management in general.

It seems to me that it is the responsibility of management, to its shareholders, to tighten, not only its security programs but to take such steps as may be necessary to establish the kind of climate in which dishonesty is less likely to breed. Specifically, I feel that an insistence for good and orderly housekeeping is an essential basis for good security conditions. Fair but firm and constant enforcement of institutional rules can constitute an increased respect for all operating regulations.

In these ways, perhaps the terrible losses that some of us will find confronting us might be eliminated—and as a result, we might assist in the developing of better employees and citizens.

---

## PRESIDENT'S REPORT

Fellow members, ladies, and gentlemen:

By way of my annual report, I have been encouraged to say something of my travels. According to some, I have become known as the Richard Halliburton President, not quite swimming the Hellespont, but SCUBA diving in the Mediterranean.

To outline my year past, from the last Seminar until Christmas, for the most part I stayed at home planning and organizing. I did make time to visit the Camden-Philadelphia Chapter and my own Connecticut Chapter. From January to June I scheduled a period of extensive travel. From June until now I have stayed at home pulling together the loose ends to complete what I consider a rather successful year. Since my travels appear to be most interesting to many, I will launch into them.

In January I set forth to visit as many Chapters as I possibly could. My first swath was through this, the South Central Region, centered around the Board meeting which was held here in the middle of January. I visited the Chapters Metropolitan New York en route, Baton Rouge, Houston, North Texas, Tulsa, Albuqurque, Kansas City and Louisville on return. This trip took sixteen (16) days.

February was light, but I did attend the meeting of the Boston Chapter.

In March I headed west for the western regional conference and visited Denver, Salt Lake-Ogden, Idaho Falls, Seattle, Monterey for the conference, and Honolulu. The western region trip took nineteen (19) days. Phoenix had been scheduled and so had been Detroit, but my trip was cut short by the need to be in Paris at NATO for the European Chapter organizational meeting in early April.

Russ White and I went over together to Paris, where we had a very interesting and educational three days with Sid Rubenstein, Vic Keay and Jim Lynch at NATO. From Paris I moved to Nice, Cannes, Toulon, Geneva, Zurich, Vienna, and Amsterdam-Rotterdam-The Hague. There is nothing like Paris in spring nor the Riviera at Easter. At Cannes I had the pleasure of SCUBA diving in the Mediterranean on an underwater vehicle like an electric torpedo. I spent an hour and a half submerged. The mermaids were gorgeous below, the bikinis were intriguing topside. The European trip was accomplished in fifteen (15) days. I am still "catching up" with myself.

Almost immediately upon return from Europe, I attended the Military-Industrial Conference in Chicago and chaired a panel. While there I visited the Chicago Chapter and then the Central Minnesota Chapter. This was accomplished in six (6) days.

Shortly after returning from this trip and centered around the Miami Board meeting, I made a swath through the Southeast Region—the Miami Chapter, St. Petersburg, Cape Canaveral, Eglin Air Force Base, North Alabama, Greater Atlanta, Augusta and Birmingham (13 days), to return home and meet with the Detroit Chapter and my own Connecticut Chapter.

In June I attended the Northeast Regional Conference in New York and was the principal speaker at the Industrial Security Association of Canada. At this, their annual meeting in Ottawa, I was honored by being made an honorary member of their Association. Liaison with the Canadian Association as well as the Industrial Security Society of Germany has been established.

Altogether I was away from home on these travels 100 days. The situation became so bad that when I telephoned home from Vienna, my children asked me, "AREN'T you coming home, Daddy?" instead of their usual, "WHEN are you coming home?" I visited thirty Chapters and traveled 30,000 miles. Between the Annual Seminars and associated Board meetings, I attended three Board meetings, two Regional Conferences; attended a formal reception given by us for the top Security officials in Washington; called on several Government Security officials; spent time in the Washington office with General Fagg; and altogether, with way stations, side trips and bistro stops, had a very interesting, enjoyable, even if hectic, six months.

The purpose of all this travel was to visit the Chapters; to answer the questions, to stimulate them

and increase interest and membership; and to show them that the National was interested in them. I believe that the travel has had the desired results. In new Chapters and membership at the start of the fiscal year, at our last Seminar we had 45 Chapters, 1655 members and affiliates. Today we have 52 Chapters, and 2073 members and affiliates. The new Chapters are: Cape Canaveral, Eglin Air Force Base, European, Greater Atlanta, Idaho Falls, Miami, and San Bernardino-Riverside. In addition, I have in hand petitions for the formation of the Kansas City Chapter and the Puget Sound Chapter.

**END OF TRAVELOGUE**

Since June I have been doing only administration. This has been pointed at turning over to my successor a good solid platform of organization from which he can take a point of departure. Indeed, my efforts this whole year have been to establish a solid platform in organization for the Society. This I feel I have accomplished. At the beginning of the year I set forth specific "planks" which I will state again at this time:

1. Develop the association of ASIS with Government by continuing our fine relationship with DOD and extend our relationship with other departments and agencies, e.g., AEC, Attorney General, FBI, Department of Commerce, OCDM, State Department, CIA, Secret Service, Coast Guard.
2. Develop a program with the help and assistance of the Board of Directors to attract members of non-defense industry into the Society.
3. Concentrate on the committees and extend their findings into the hands of the membership.
4. Continue the membership recruiting campaign.

In regard to developing the association of ASIS with Government, I feel that we have accomplished this. This has been done by myself, General Fagg, Stan Tracy, our Chairman of Public Affairs; Jim Davis, Chairman, and members of his Committee on Safeguarding Classified Information; Irvin Hibbs, Chairman, and his Committee members on Disaster Planning; and by many others of our members on a personal and individual basis.

We have established a fine working relationship and liaison with the National Space and Aeronautics Agency (NASA); with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization (OCDM). We have maintained a fine relationship with DOD, as demonstrated in the very splendid workshop conducted by Tyler Port and the participants from DOD, and we have developed a closer liaison with other departments and agencies.

A concrete example is the outstanding July issue of *Industrial Security*, which was devoted entirely to Civil Defense and Emergency Planning. This one volume is the latest and best in why and how indus-

*(Continued on next page)*


GATE GUARDING EFFICIENCY

*High turnstile control*



*Low turnstile control*

Perey Turnstiles–

...Prevent Unauthorized Entry ...Provide Automatic Emergency Exits

...Reduce Number of Guards ...Prevent Stealing of Tools, Materials

Submit your problem to our application engineers



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trial security officials should plan and prepare for Civil Defense, Disaster Control, Defense Mobilization and Industrial Survival—all of which is national survival. 40,000 copies are in the hands of Civil Defense officials for their use and for distribution to industry. Professional Civil Defense directors have recommended that 1,000,000 copies be provided by OCDM for distribution to the 400,000 industrial and manufacturing plants and the 300,000 major business, commercial and financial firms throughout the Nation. OCDM, in transmitting this issue of *Industrial Security*, effectively states that this is a "must" for company Civil Defense plans and defense preparedness. Distribution has begun and everywhere this issue of our magazine is being acclaimed. Locally, my own immediate superior, Frank Kelly, the Civil Defense Director of New London, Connecticut, says that everyone says it is the best volume on Civil Defense and disaster preparedness they have seen to date. At luncheon today, Irvin Hibbs, our Disaster Planning Committee Chairman, announced that the United States Civil Defense Council paid us tribute by formalizing a resolution expressing deep appreciation for this issue of *Industrial Security*. At luncheon today, Virgil Couch, fellow member and the Director, Industry Office, OCDM, presented to me for ASIS the OCDM Award: Certificate of Appreciation in recognition of outstanding contribution to the cause of non-military defense in industry by providing assistance and support to the National Program for Industrial Survival.

All of this activity has contributed to the accomplishment of one of our principal aims—to be recognized as the national authority on Industrial Security. In regard to this aim, it is my opinion that we have come a long way this year in recognition, not only by Government, but by industry, the public and our members. We have gained in stature. It is significant that *Business Week* has assigned a top reporter to cover this Seminar to write a feature article on our Society.

In regard to Plank No. 2, all I can report is progress. Accomplishment, no. Again, however, the progress in developing our so called non-defense program, although not resulting in complete accomplishment, has been tangible. To those like me, it has been rather difficult to develop a non-defense program since my work is involved in a defense industry. However, this year we have had an influx into the Society of members who are from retail, transportation, utilities, oil, gas, lumber. With their influx and with the solid organization I have given you, I do feel that we have made progress and that Plank No. 2 did not completely fail. This non-defense program will be further developed by my successor.

In regard to Plank No. 3, I have concentrated on the Committees. They for the most part have become more solidly organized; they have set up short and long range projects and programs, some of which have been accomplished. I cite in particular the Safeguarding Classified Information Committee—Jim Davis; the Professional Criteria Committee—Peter Lane;

the Security Education Committee—Donald Gere; the Publications Committee—Charles Johnson; The Public Affairs Committee—Stan Tracy; Disaster Planning—Irvin Hibbs; Physical Security—Charlie LaForge; Subversive Activities—Carrol Harrison. Their findings have and will get into your hands. Our Security Movie Committee—John Norton—has made progress; a concrete proposal from the producer is under negotiation.

Plank No. 4, the membership recruiting campaign, rather speaks for itself. I repeat, a year ago we had 1655 members and affiliates. Today we have 2073. New members and affiliates recruited this year number 661, attrition 243, for a net gain of 418. This has been done without my concentration on membership. For these results Ernie Felago, our Board member charged with membership, the Regional Vice Presidents Walsh, Marcotte, Robbins, Oldham, O'Neill, Knight, Hale; and all of our Chapter Chairmen are credited.

Financially our Society has done well, showing a $10,000 cash gain in the treasury—an increase of almost 50% this year. This gain has been accomplished although expenditures were made for the good of the Society in the amount of about $84,000—about one and one-half times the expenditures of last year. Our net worth today is almost $35,000. This I attribute to the increase in membership, to the efforts of our members, and the good management of our Executive Director, Fate Fagg.

At this point I wish to thank all of my Officers, Committee Chairmen and Chapter Chairmen for for their services so ably rendered; members of the Board for their firm guidance and direction; and all of the members and affiliates for their strong support.

For the future I see an ever rapidly growing Society, one growing in numbers of Chapters and members, one growing in stature. Statistically, Dick Healy last year stated that our potential was 10,000 members. Although that is a large goal for which to strive, I predict that we will reach it. We have been and are rendering a great public service in the interests of country and industry. Our anticapated greater growth, which already has been remarkable, will enable us to give even greater service to industry and the Nation.

Our companies have been honored to contribute the services of their men tothis Society, even as you and I. This service, as you all know, is voluntary and supported by our companies; this including my rather extensive travels this year. With today's world situation more critical than ever, as evidenced by Khrushchev and by the defectors Martin and Mitchell, the services of ASIS are more necessary than ever.

I have been asked to present in my report suggestions for the next President. I say to you, JOHN BUCKLEY, carry on!

Ladies and gentlemen, it has been my privilege to serve you.

E. L. Barr, Jr., President—1959-60


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The use of approved and properly designed security systems is now a recognized standard in safeguarding our nation's security installations.

Automatic intrusion detection systems are designed to safeguard huge outdoor areas or a single room.

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

Electronic devices detect intruders who enter an electromagnetic field set up by antennas surrounding a restricted area.

**INVISIBLE RAY SYSTEM:**

Photoelectric devices detect intruders who intercept an invisible beam of light.

**ULTRASONIC SYSTEM:**



High frequency sound waves detect any one walking within a guarded area, and give an automatic alarm.

For more details on these and other types of security systems, phone the ADT office listed in your directory or write our executive office in New York.

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# EXHIBITS





## LIST OF EXHIBITORS

**Airtronics International Corp. of Florida**
6900 West Road
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida

**American District Telegraph Co.**
155 6th Avenue
New York 13, N. Y.

**American Telephone & Telegraph Co.**
New York, N. Y.

**Auto Photo Company**
1100 East 33rd St.
Los Angeles 11, Calif.

**Best Universal Lock Co., Inc.**
6161 E. 75th St. (Box 103)
Indianapolis 6, Indiana

**The William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency**
101 Park Avenue
New York 17, N. Y.

**Carter Engineering Co.**
6762 Greenville Avenue
Dallas, Texas

**Delcon Corp.**
943 Industrial Avenue
Palo Alto, Calif.

**Donovan Uniform Co., Inc.**
171 Parkhouse
Dallas, Texas

**E. I. DuPont de Nemours**
1007 Market Street
Wilmington 98, Delaware

**Electron Corp.**
P. O. Box 5570
Dallas, Texas

**General Electric**
Communication Products Dept.
Lynchburg, Virginia

**Glassoloid Corp. of America**
32 Wellington Street
Clifton, N. J.

**Paul Hardeman, Inc.**
10579 Dale Ave.
Stanton, Calif.

**Walter Kidde & Co., Inc.**
675 Main St.
Belleville 9, N. J.

**Laminated Plastics Service Co.**
1220 Maple Ave.
Los Angeles, Calif.

**Law and Order Magazine**
72 West 45th St.
New York 36, N. Y.

**Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.**
2747 4th Ave. South
Minneapolis, Minn.

**Mosler Research Products**
320 5th Ave.
New York, N. Y.

**Motivation Production, Inc.**
Security Division
115 W. 45th St.
New York 36, N. Y.

**Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc.**
7138 Envoy Ct.
Dallas, Texas

**Perey Turnstiles**
Perey Mfg. Co., Inc.
101 Park Ave.
New York 17, N. Y.

**Philco**
Government & Industrial Group
4700 Wissahickon Ave.
Philadelphia 44, Pa.

**Pinkerton National Detective Agency**
100 Church Street
New York 7, N. Y.

**Sargent & Greenleaf, Inc.**
Rochester 21, N. Y.

**Sargent-Sowell, Inc.**
1172 107th St.
Grand Prairie, Texas

**J. B. Sedberry, Inc.**
Tyler, Texas

**Shaw-Walker Co.**
405 Lexington Ave.
New York 17, N. Y.

**Singer-Bridgeport**
A Div. of the Singer Mfg. Co.
Bridgeport 8, Conn.

**Steelcase, Inc.**
Grand Rapids, Mich.

**Teletronic Systems Corp.**
8700 Bellanca Ave.
Los Angeles 45, Calif.

**Texas Educational Aids**
4006 Live Oak
Dallas, Texas

**Virginia Laminating Co.**
Amelia, Virginia

**Vought Electronics**
A Division of Chance Vought Aircraft, Inc.
Dallas 22, Texas

**Wandel Machine Co., Inc.**
Pomeroy, Pennsylvania

# GENERAL HIGHLIGHTS

ASIS Board Meeting

Left, A. T. Deere holds citation for best article published in Industrial Security 1960; center, Eric L. Barr, Jr.; right, Arthur G. Coffman holds citation given to Los Angeles Chapter for most new members.



Left to right: Hulon Cockrell, Joe Adelman, Robert J. Kelley and Dick Smith.

Eric L. Barr, Jr., receives award from Virgil Couch to ASIS for outstanding work in civil defense.

# Social Activities-
# Fun
# Western Style

HERE



# Registrants in Attendance 6th National Seminar ASIS

ABBOTT, NORMAN—Wm. J. Burns Intl. Det. Agcy.
Dallas, Texas
AHERN, JOHN J.—General Motors Corp.
Birmingham, Michigan
ALDERDICE, WILLIAM B.,—Chance Vought Aircraft
Dallas, Texas
ALDERMAN, R. E.—Singer-Bridgeport
Bridgeport, Connecticut
ALLAN, JOHN F.—Boeing Airplane Co.
Mary Esther, Florida
ANDERLE, LT. CHARLES K.—U. S. Navy BWR
Fort Worth, Texas
ANDERSON, E. D.—Singer-Bridgeport
Bridgeport, Connecticut
ASHMORE, DICK (R.D.)—Texas Instruments Inc.
Dallas, Texas
ASHTON, ALFRED P.—Johns Hopkins Univ.
Baltimore, Maryland
ATKINSON, JAMES N.—Sylvania Electric Prod.
Buffalo, New York
AVRIGAN, H. C.—Singer-Bridgeport
Bridgeport, Connecticut
BARNARD, LEROY H.,—Lockheed Aircraft Service
Freeport, New York
BARR, ERIC L., JR.—Electric Boat, Gen. Dynamics
Groton, Connecticut
BATEMAN, CHARLES B.—United Shoe Machinery Corp.
Ipswich, Massachusetts
BATES, JACK K.—Ling-Temco
Greenville, Texas
BEASLEY, MARVIN C.—Midwest Engineering & Constr.
Kansas City, Missouri
BEASLEY, WALLACE D.—Texas A & M College
College Station, Texas
BEDELL, C. U.—Boeing Airplane Company
Wichita, Kansas
BELL, ROBERT C.—NASA
Washington, D. C.
BENEDICT, T. W.—Singer-Bridgeport
Bridgeport, Connecticut
BERRY, ALFRED B.—Douglas Aircraft
Palos Verdes, California
BILLIS, THOMAS W.—Hercules Powder Company
Magna, Utah
BOEYE, R. B.—Goodyear Atomic Corp.
Portsmouth, Ohio
BOISE, ROBERT J.—Ford Motor Company
Dearborn, Michigan
BOND, RICHARD C.—U. S. Information Agency
Kensington, Maryland
BOOSEL, HARRY X.—U. S. Navy
Chicago, Illinois
BOYATT, JAMES W.—Hughes Aircraft
Fullerton, California
BRACY, CLARENCE W.—General Plant Protection Corp.
Los Angeles, California
BRADSHAW, C. L.—Alcoa
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
BRAEMER, FRED E.—Globe Intl. Det. System
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
BRANHAM, ERNEST H.—Wm. J. Burns Intl. Det. Agcy.
Kansas City, Missouri
BRINKS, OSCAR H.—Artcraft Company
Quincy, Illinois
BROOKSHIRE, LEO A.—Thiokol Chemical Corp.
Huntsville, Alabama
BROWN, WADE B.—Michigan Bell Tel. Co.
Detroit, Michigan
BUCKLEY, JOHN L.—United Technology Corp.
Sunnyvale, California
BUELL, C. R.—Union Carbide Corp.
New York, New York
BURKE, J. W.—Bendix Corp.
Kansas City, Missouri
BURSTEIN, HARVEY—Mass. Institute of Technology
Brookline, Massachusetts
BUSH, ELMO A.—Wm. J. Burns Intl. Det. Agency
Tulsa, Oklahoma
CALAME, RAYMOND—Bell Tele. Lab.
Long Island, New York
CALDWELL, JAMES C.—NASA
Santa Monica, California
CAMPBELL, JIM—Glassaloid Corp. of America
Clifton, New Jersey
CARNEY, JOHN M.—Space Tech. Lab.
Patrick AFB, Florida
CAROTHERS, A. W.—Midwest Eng. & Const.
Kansas City, Missouri
CHANDLER, T. K.—Ramo Wooldridge
Denver, Colorado
CHAPMAN, P. B.—Sears, Roebuck & Company
Dallas, Texas
CHAPMAN, R. M.—Rocketdyne
McGregor, Texas
CHESSHIR, DENNIS A.—CONVAIR, A Div. of
General Dynamics Corp., Fort Worth, Texas
CHILMAN, W. A.—Chrysler Corp.
Detroit, Michigan
CHRISTENSEN, DAVID H.—U. S. Government
McLean, Virginia
CIPRA, L. L.—IBM Federal Systems Div.
Rockville, Maryland
CHRISTIANSEN, D. G.—Detroit-Edison Co.
Detroit, Michigan
CLAYTON, J. M., SR.—USAF
Washington, D. C.
CLIFT, ROBERT E.—Hdqt. Air Defense Command
Ent AFB, Colorado
CLINKINBEARD, A. L.—Chance Vought Aircraft, Inc.
Dallas, Texas
COCKRELL, HULON D.—Temco Electronics & Missiles
Dallas, Texas
COFFMAN, A. G.—Rocketdyne
Canoga Park, California
CONNER, WILLIAM M.—Esso Standard
Linden, New Jersey
CONNELL, GEORGE B.—Reynolds Metals Company
Corpus Christi, Texas
CORNETT, W. M.—Aeronutronic Div. of Ford Motor
Newport Beach, California
CORTESI, E. J.—Reynolds Metals Company
Hinsdale, Illinois
COUCH, VIRGIL L.—O.C.D.M.
Battle Creek, Michigan
COX, C. W.—Mobil Chemical Company
Beaumont, Texas
CROUGHAN, J. W.—Sears, Roebuck & Company
Los Angeles, California
CROW, HARRY L., JR.,—Johns Hopkins University
Bethesda, Maryland
CURRAN, J. M.—Signal Corps, U. S. Army
Washington, D. C.
CURRY, ALTON B.—Beddoe Prtg. Co.
Dallas, Texas
CURTIS, S. J.—J. L. Hudson Co.
Detroit, Michigan
DAHL, CLIFFORD E.—Librascope, Div. General Precision
Glendale, California
DAVIS, G. H.—Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.
DAVIS, JOHN S.—Wm. J. Burns Intl. Det. Agency
Athens, Alabama
DEERE, A. T.—Dow Chemical Company
Freeport, Texas
DENIGER, WILLIAM S.—Texas Inst. Inc.
Dallas, Texas
DENNIS, ROBERT L.—System Dev. Corp.
Santa Monica, California

DENZEL, JAMES L.—Cornell Aero. Lab. Inc.
Kenmore, New York
DIERST, GLENN V.—Boeing Airplane Co.
Seattle, Washington
DILLON, JOHN B.—The Martin Company
Denver, Colorado
DIMICHELE, ALFREDO D.—IBM Corp.
Yorktown, New York
DITTBRENNER, J. P.—General Electric Co.
Huntsville, Alabama
DOERING, CYRUS E.—CONVAIR, A Div. of
General Dynamics Corp., Fort Worth, Texas
DOHERTY, J. F.—Bell Tele. Labs.
New York, New York
DONOVAN, JACK—Donovan Uniform Co.
Dallas, Texas
DOUGHERTY, F. L.—Hercules Powder Co.
Wilmington, Delaware
DREWETT, ALBERT E.—IBM Corp.
Endicott, New York
DUNSTAN, WILLIAM N.—Lytle Corp.
Albuquerque, New Mexico
EBRIGHT, A. R.—Reynolds Metals Co.
Richmond, Virginia
EDSON, EUGENE T.—General Electric Co.
St. Petersburg, Florida
EIDSON, JIM—Space Corporation
Dallas, Texas
EISENBEIS, FRANK F.—Rocketdyne
McGregor, Texas
ELKINS, EUGENE V.—INSMAT
Washington, D. C.
ELLINGTON, JOHN A.—Temco Electronics & Missiles
Dallas, Texas
ENDRES, MARTIN—Cadillac Enameling Works, Inc.
Detroit, Michigan
ENGLISH, R. E.—Ordnance Ammunition Comm.
Joliet, Illinois
ERICKSON, REUBEN C.—Temco Electronics & Missiles
Dallas, Texas
ERICKSON, RUSSELL A.—Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
Dallas, Texas
FAGG, W. L.—ASIS Exec. Director
Washington, D. C.
FAIRBANKS, CARL S.—Shaw-Walker Co.
New York, New York
FARLEY, THOMAS B.—General Electric Company
Richland, Washington
FAWCETT, GARLAND—Chance Vought Aircraft, Inc.
Dallas, Texas
FELAGO, E. E.—General Precision
Yonkers, New York
FERNAN, JAMES—Bendix Corporation
Kansas City, Missouri
FIELDS, WILLIAM E.—IBM Corporation
Oswego, New York
FINN, JOHN E.—Bell Helicopter Company
Fort Worth, Texas
FITZPATRICK, B. J.—Mobil Oil Co. de Venezuela
Caracas, Venezuela
FISHER, JOHN M.—Sears Roebuck & Company
Chicago, Illinois
FORMAN, JOSEPH—Owl Protective Company, Inc.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
FOSTER, H. L.—Commonwealth of Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky
GABBERT, JOHN R.—Collins Radio Co.
Richardson, Texas
GAINES, ROBERT W.—NASA, Lewis Research Center.
Brecksville, Ohio
GALLAGHER, FRANK S.—Ford Div., Ford Motor Co.
Dearborn, Michigan
GARRETT, W. W.—Westinghouse Corp.
Kansas City, Missouri
GEARHART, D. C.—General Electric Co.
Santa Barbara, California
GERE, DONALD W.—Ramo-Wooldridge
Canoga Park, California
GIDLONSEN, DON—Frazier-Davis Const. Co.
St. Louis, Missouri
GODDARD, R. J.—Hughes Aircraft Co.
Hawthorne, California
GOODRIDGE, WILLIAM G., JR.—Burroughs Corp.
Upper Darby, Pennsylvania
GORHAM, JOHN T.—Bell Aerosystems Co.
Buffalo, New York
GRANGER, B. H.—General Electric Co.
Phoenix, Arizona
HAARLOW, A. W.—Illinois Bell Telephone
Chicago, Illinois
HAAS, CHARLES—Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.
HABERMAN, R. J. (DICK)—ADT
Houston, Texas
HALE, I. B.—CONVAIR, A Div. of
General Dynamics Corp., Fort Worth, Texas
HALL, ALLAN J.—USAF
Hollywood, California
HAMILL, EMMA LEE—Collins Radio Corp.
Dallas, Texas
HAMMOND, MAJOR GEORGE M.—U. S. Army
Denver, Colorado
HANSEN, PAUL—Reynolds Metal Co.
Richmond, Virginia
HANSEN, WILLIAM E.—Jet Propulsion Lab.
Pasadena, California
HART, PAUL M.—U. S. Government
Bellaire, Texas
HARTLEIN, JOHN JR.—Redstone Arsenal
Huntsville, Alabama
HAYDEN, CHARLES E.—Philco Corp.
Palo Alto, California
HEADLEY, W. R.—General Electric Company
San Jose, California
HEALY, RICHARD J.—Aerospace Corp.
Los Angeles, California
HEDRICK, EARL C.—El Paso Natl. Gas Prod. Co.
El Paso, Texas
HENIG, JOSEPH H.—Dept. of the Navy
Washington, D. C.
HEREFORD, ROBERT O.—Wm. J. Burns Intl. Det. Agency
Los Angeles, California
HERLIHY, JOHN F.—U. S. Government
Rockville, Maryland
HIBBS, IRVIN E.—American Syn. Rubber Co.
Louisville, Kentucky
HIGGINS, GEORGE D., JR.—CONVAIR, A Div. of
General Dynamics Corp., San Diego, California
HODGE, J. N.—RCA
Moorestown, N. J.
HOLMES, MISS MARTHA K.—Ramo-Wooldridge
Washington, D. C.
HOWARTH, COL. E. S.—USAF Headquarters
HOWE, JIM—ARO, Incorporated
Tullahoma, Tennessee
HOWELLS, F. W.—Singer-Bridgport
Bridgeport, Connecticut
HUMPHREYS, W. Y.—United Aircraft Corp.
Hartford, Connecticut
HURLEY, DAVID D.—Sandia Corp.-Livermore Lab.
Livermore, California
ILES, JOHN T.—General Dynamics, General Atomic Div.
San Diego, California
INMAN, BERT D.—Westinghouse Corp.
San Francisco, California
ISON, JACK E.—American Security Council
Chicago, Illinois
IVY, J. M.—Humble Oil & Refining Co.
Tulsa, Oklahoma
JACKSON, MAJOR WILLIAM R.—USAF
Los Angeles, California
JACOPPI, JOHN J.—Western Electric Co. Inc.
New York, New York
JENSEN, CHARLES M.—The Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.
Chicago, Illinois
JERGENSEN, JOHN W.—Bendix-Pacific Div.
North Hollywood, California
JONES, JACK J.—The Murray Company of Texas
Dallas, Texas
JONES, RICHARD C.—General Electric Co.
Ithaca, New York
JOYCE, THOMAS E.—Space Electronics Corp.
Glendale, California
KAISER, EDWARD J.—ADT Co.
Washington, D. C.
KANE, B. G.—Hughes Aircraft Co.
Tucson, Arizona
KARCHER, R. E.—Singer-Bridgeport
Bridgeport, Connecticut
KATELEY, JULIAN—Michigan Bell Tele. Co.
Detroit, Mich.

KEATING, T. H.—American Patrol Service
San Francisco, California
KEELEY, JOSEPH J.—University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan
KELLER, ROBERT C.—Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.
KELLERMAN, DAN W.—Supv. INSMAT, NE Dist.
New York, New York
KELLEY, ROBERT J.—Neiman-Marcus
Dallas, Texas
KELLEY, ROYAL H.—Chance Vought Aircraft
Dallas, Texas
KELLY, EUGENE B.—Bendix Systems Div.
Ann Arbor, Michigan
KELLY, SAM—University of California
Livermore, California
KEW, R. C.—Singer-Bridgeport
Bridgeport, Connecticut
KING, E. KENNETH—Espey Mfg. & Elect. Corp.
Saratoga Springs, New York
KING, GEORGE E. B.—Wm. J. Burns Intl. Det. Agency
San Francisco, California
KING, MISS OUIDA G.—Parker Aircraft
Los Angeles, California
KIRBY, EDWARD R.—Edward Hines Lumber Co.
Chicago, Illinois
KIRBY, GILBERT H.—Eastman Kodak Co.
Rochester 17, New York
KNAPP, HAROLD D.—RCA
Camden, New Jersey
KNOX, WILLIAM D.—Librascope,-Div. of General
Precision Instruments, Glendale, California
KOTINEK, CAPT. JAMES J.—U. S. Army
Fort Hood, Texas
KREIDEL, FRANCIS A.—Brig. Gen. USA (Ret.)
Raytheon Company, Waltham, Massachusetts
LAUERSDORF, WILLIAM F.—U. S. Army Cleveland Ord.
Distributor, Bay Village, Ohio
LAVOIE, RICHARD J.—Int. Tel. & Tel. Corp.
New York, New York
LEITH, STANLEY W.—Boeing Airplane Co.
Seattle, Washington
LELAND, D. L.—U. S. Navy
Yellow Springs, Ohio
LEVERS, RICHARD C.—Pinkerton's National Det. Agency
Tampa, Florida
LINDSAY, M. H. A.—ADT Co., Inc.
New York, New York
LINDSEY, FRANK F.—Retail Credit Co.
Dallas, Texas
LINGVALL, WALTER C.—U. S. Rubber Co., Res. Center
Wayne, New Jersey
LYNCH, JAMES C.—NATO Hawk Mgmt. Office
France-Seine et oise
LYNCHEY, JAMES M.—Burroughs Corp.
Detroit 2, Michigan
MCBRAYER, J. R., JR.—Col., USAF
Washington, D. C.
MCBRIDE, G. R.—Argonne National Lab.
Idaho Falls, Idaho
MCDONAGH, EDWARD P.—M & C. Div.—Texas Inst.
Attleboro, Massachusetts
MCELHANY, J. C.—GMC—Research Lab.
Warren, Michigan
MCFARLIN, M. W.—Lockheed Missiles & Space Div.
Sunnyvale, California
MCGLAMERY, C. L.—Chance Vought Aircraft
Dallas, Texas
MCGREAL, HUGH B.—Allis Chalmers Mfg.
West Allis, Wisconsin
MCKENNA, JOHN L.—American Tel. & Tel. Co.
New York, New York
MCMAHON, J. F.—CONVAIR, Div. Gen. Dynamics
Fort Worth, Texas
MACCLAIN, GEORGE—Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.
MALLOY, JOHN J.—Rocketdyne
Waco, Texas
MALONE, LEE F.—Burroughs Corporation
Detroit, Michigan
MANN, JACK L.—American Patrol Service
San Leandro, California
MARRETT, JOHN E.—Bell Telephone of Canada
St. Hilaire, P. Q.
MARTIN, R. C.—Wm. J. Burns Intl. Det. Agency
El Paso, Texas
MAXEY, J. O.—ADT Company, Inc.
New York, New York
MERBACH, ROBERT H.—Space Technology Lab.
Los Angeles, California
MERRELL, ROY D.—Lone Star Steel
Naples, Texas
MILLER, A. ROSS—North American Aviation
El Segundo, California
MILLER, NOBLE F.—Pacific Tele. & Telegraph
San Francisco, California
MILLER, R. L.—Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Buffalo, New York
MILROY, RUSSELL—Sentry Does Inc.
San Juan, Puerto Rico
MINITER, MILES J.—Orinoco Mining Co.
Venezuela, S. A.
MITCHAM, FRANK—Chance Vought Aircraft, Inc.
Dallas, Texas
MITCHELL, JOHN D.—Collins Radio Corporation
Richardson, Texas
MONTANO, E. D.—Alpha Corporation
Richardson, Texas
MONTFORT, FRANK E.—Consolidated Film Ind.
Hollywood, California
MOON, F. R.—Sandia Corporation
Albuquerque, New Mexico
MOONEY, COLVIN H.—Boeing Airplane Company
Seattle, Washington
MOORE, JAMES L., JR.—Tennessee Eastman Co.
Kingsport, Tennessee
MORAN, JAMES D.—Major, U. S. Army, D.O.D.
Fort Holabird, Maryland
MORLAND, ACHILLE J., JR.—General Electric Co.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
MORRISON, PAUL R.—RCA
Camden, New Jersey
MORSE, GEORGE P.—National Inst. of Health
Bethesda, Maryland
MORTON, ALLAN B.—Monsanto Chemical Company
Miamisburg, Ohio
MOWREY, MARSHALL, JR.—North American Aviation
Columbus, Ohio
MULLENS, BERT C.—American Airlines
Tulsa, Oklahoma
MURPHY, PETER—Nuclear Development Corp. of America
White Plains, New York
NOBLES, DON H.—Rocketdyne
Waco, Texas
NORMAN, OTTO B.—Continental Electronics Mfg. Company
Dallas, Texas
NORTON, O. P.—Johns Hopkins University
Silver Spring, Maryland
O'CONNOR, T. J.—McDonnell Aircraft
Hicksville, L. I., New York
O'DONNELL, COLONEL C. M.—McDonnell Acft.
St. Louis, Missouri
OFFENHAUSER, C. F.—Offenhauser Company
Houston, Texas
O'NEILL, THOMAS J.—Stanford Research Inst.
Menlo Park, California
OWEN, ROBERT H.—General Electric Co.
Scotia, New York
OWENS, LEWIS H.—Chance Vought Aircraft
Dallas, Texas
PARCHMAN, JOHN B.—Texas Instuments, Inc.
Dallas, Texas
PARR, E. S.—Burns Intl. Det. Agency
Dallas, Texas
PARSONS, CECIL D.—Bill Jack Scientific Inst. Co.
Solan Beach, California
PATTON, A. GORDON—USAF
Washington, D. C.
PENLAND, JACK D.—Mich. Bell Tele. Co.
Detroit, Michigan
PETRI, HOWARD R.—General Electric
Patrick AFB, Florida
PIEPER, ELMER C.—USAF
San Bernardino, California
PIRANI, MISS CLAIRE—M.I.T. Inst. Lab.
Cambridge, Massachusetts
PLANE, MRS. LUCILLE G.—Johannessen & Girard
Phoenix, Arizona
PLANT, FRANCIS X.—Dept. of Army
Washington, D. C.

POE, WARREN C.—Naval Research Lab.
Washington, D. C.
PORT, A. T.—Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.
PRICE, JOSEPH F.—RCA
Camden, New Jersey
PRICE, RALPH A.—Civil Defense
Augusta, Maine
PRYOR, CARL—Sperry Phoenix Co.
Phoenix, Arizona
PURVIS, FLOYD E.—Texas Inst. Inc. S/C Div.
Richardson, Texas
QUILLEN, CAPT. EUGENE K.—U. S. Army
Baltimore, Maryland
QUINN, HORACE A.—American Machine & Foundry Co.
Greenwich, Connecticut
RAFFENSPERGER, H. E.—Eli Lilly Company
Indianapolis, Indiana
RASMUSSEN, RAY—U. S. Army
San Francisco, California
REDPATH, JAMES A.—Eitel McCullough, Inc.
San Bruno, California
REICHARD, SHELDON E.—General Electric
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
RICHARDSON, FRANK A.—Northrop Corp.
Hermosa Beach, California
ROBERTS, W. M., JR.—Lackland Air Force Base
San Antonio, Texas
ROBIN, RICHARD C.—General Electric
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
ROBINSON, GERARD G.—American Machine & Foundry Co.
Saugatuck, Connecticut
ROMANO, LAWRENCE J.—The Mitre Corp.
Bedford, Massachusetts
RONDEAU, FLOYD J.—Arizona Public Serv.
Phoenix, Arizona
RUMSEY, COL. IVAN C.—Department of Defense
Kansas City
RUSSELL, A. LEWIS, Caracas, Venezuela
RYAN, GEORGE W.—The Wackenhut Corp.
Miami, Florida
RYAN, THOMAS W.—Niagara Mohawk Power
Buffalo, New York
SANFORD, C. WESLEY—Stanford Security Serv.
Ann Arbor, Michigan
SCHAPPERT, R. J., JR.,—BWR
Dallas, Texas
SCHURMAN, E. A.—Bell Helicopter
Fort Worth, Texas
SCHWAB, CAPT. PAUL F.—USAF
Patterson AFB, Ohio
SCODIUS, VICTOR J.—Burroughs Research
Paoli, Pennsylvania
SHARP, GEORGE C.—General Burglar Alarm
Barrington, New Jersey
SHIELDS, JOHN R.—Sears, Roebuck & Co.
La Grange, Illinois
SILK, RALPH E.—Lockheed Missile-Space
Cape Canaveral, Florida
SIMMERS, CHARLES K.—Northrop Corp.
Van Nuvs, California
SIMPSON, DALE O.—Dale Simpson & Associates
Dallas, Texas
SIMPSON, GEO. H.—IBM
New York, New York
SLATTERY, LT. COL. CLEMENT G.—USAF
Baltimore, Maryland
SMALLING, CARLOS—Wash. Technology Assoc.
Rockville, Maryland
SMITH, EVERETT W.—Dow Chemical Company
Midland, Michigan
SMITH, GORDAN C.—Sears, Roebuck & Company
Levittown, Pennsylvania
SMITH, HOWARD N., JR.—Rogers & Smith
Dallas, Texas
SMITH, P. T.—U. S. Navy
Santa Maria, California
SMITH, RICHARD E.—Chance Vought Aircraft
Dallas, Texas
SMITH, S. W.—Boeing Airplane Co.
Wichita, Kansas
SMITH, THOMAS D. JR.—U. S. Army
San Antonio, Texas
SOLEM, MRS. RUTH M.—U. S. Navy
Silver Spring, Maryland
STEAD, CHARLES L.—Chrysler Corp.
Birmingham, Michigan
STONE, WILTON R.—Texas Inst. Apparatus Div.
Dallas, Texas
STOUT, HAROLD L.—Midwest Research Inst.
Kansas City, Missouri
STUBER, PAUL—Reynolds Metals
Richmond, Virginia
SUDDERTH, DIXIE—Chance Vought Aircraft
Dallas, Texas
SULLIVAN, WILLIAM T.—Tex. Inst. S/C Div.
Richardson, Texas
SUTTON, CHARLES D.—Telecomputing Service Inc.
Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico
SWEARINGEN, D. JR.—North American Aviation
Columbus, Ohio
TAYLOR, JAMES L.—Sargent and Greenleaf
Rochester, New York
TAYLOR, L. M.—Ralph M. Parsons Co.
Los Angeles, California
TAYLOR, LOGAN E.—Phillips Petroleum Co.
Idaho Falls, Idaho
THOMPSON, GEORGE T.—North American Aviation
Los Angeles, California
THRASH MILLARD C., Rochester, New York
TOBIN, JOSEPH F. JR.—American Machine and
Foundry Co., Greenwich, Connecticut
TODD, W. M.—Lockheed Aircraft
Burbank, California
TRACKLER, TED D.—Aluminum Company of America
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
TRANSUE, JOSEPH M.—Philco Corp.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
TUDOR, A. F. C.—Canadair Ltd.
Montreal, Quebec
VAN PELT, HARRY C.—North American Aviation
Downey, California
VOSTEL, VANCE—Wm. J. Burns Intl. Det. Agency
Alamorgorda, New Mexico
WAMBACH, A. G.—American Tel. & Tel. Co.
Babylon, L. I., New York
WADE, EARL S.—Wm. J. Burns Det. Agency
Denver, Colorado
WALKER, EUGENE H.—USAF
Vienna, Virginia
WALL, R. I.—CONVAIR, A Div. of
General Dynamics Corp., Fort Worth, Texas
WALSH, TIMOTHY J.—Sperry Gyroscope
Great Neck, L. I., New York
WALSH, WILLIAM V.—Texas Inst. Inc.
Dallas, Texas
WALTHERS, RALPH—Pacific Telephone
San Francisco, California
WARD, RALPH V.—Mosler Research, Inc.
Washington, D. C.
WEAVER, J. T.—Vitro Labs.
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
WEBB, C. H.—USAF
Hdq. A.N.C.
WERNER, N. C.—North American Aviation, Inc.
Ft. Walton Beach, Florida
WHELAND, RICHARD L.—Jones and Laughlin Steel
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
WHITE, RUSSELL E.—General Electric
Schenectady, New York
WHITTIER, JOHN M.—Arthur D. Little Co., Inc.
Cambridge, Mass.
WIBLE, M. KEITH—NASA
Huntsville, Alabama
WILDT, C. V., JR.—Retail Credit Company
Atlanta, Georgia
WILLIAMS, N. R., JR.—Singer-Bridgeport
Bridgeport, Connecticut
WIND, EUGENE V.—Lockheed Electronics
Plainfield, New Jersey
WOOD, EDWARD L.—U. S. Navy
Springfield, Ohio
WRIGHT, LT. COL. W. A.—USAF
Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D. C.
YANDELL, KENNETH E.—Esso Standard
New York, New York
ZIRKLE, FRANK L.—Mallory & Co., Inc.
Indianapolis, Indiana

# CONSIDERATION FOR EXHIBITORS AND ADVERTISERS

**By W. L. FAGG, Brig. Gen., USAF (Ret.)**
**Executive Director ASIS, and Editor of "Industrial Security"**

Paul Hansen, member of the Board of Directors and the Executive Committee, and Director of the Industrial Security Division for Reynolds Metals Company, was called on to speak a few words in behalf of the exhibitors at the end of the first convention session. He emphasized the importance of carefully viewing and studying the excellent exhibits at the convention. He gave as his opinion that every registrant could increase his general knowledge of security and go home and do a better job for his employer if he would observe the advances which had been made in various phases of security equipment and materials by these suppliers and determine how these suppliers could increase the efficiency for the security operations of his company or government facility.

Mr. Hansen spoke of the wisdom and necessity of supporting these suppliers who exhibit at our annual meetings and also those who buy advertising space in our magazine. Since we need this financial help to assure a successful convention, without members paying exorbitant registration fees, and to publish the magazine, *Industrial Security*, he said that it was only equitable that members support these vendors who do business with us. He said that everything else being *equal*, he was going to do everything in his power to insist that his company support these suppliers against those who do not exhibit at our annual meetings and buy advertising space in our magazine. He asked that all members follow that same course of action which he described as equitable and consistent with good business practices.

Notwithstanding the comparative youth of ASIS and the rather limited circulation of its official publication, *Industrial Security*, Mr. Hansen observed that there is no other one publication where vendors of industrial security equipment and materials can go for advertising which is so universally and thoroughly read by industrial security directors, managers and supervisors who requisition these items. This is true, he pointed out, whether it concerns physical security equipment, fire protection equipment and supplies, identification items, materials for safeguarding classified information, guard materials, or other related materials, equipment or services.

Mr. Hansen frankly admitted that the American Society for Industrial Security and its members need the cooperation of the vendors of security and protection equipment, materials, and supplies used in industrial plants and government installations. He emphasized, however, that this is a two-way street and that these suppliers also need the support of those who requisition, order or purchase items. He offered the following figures to prove his point. He said that in order to get some idea of the purchasing power of members of the Society, he had recently conducted an "audit" of a few representative companies to ascertain their costs of purchasing these materials during 1958 and 1959. This brief and admittedly superficial "audit" revealed that during this period six representative corporations made the following total purchases in the areas indicated:

| | 1958 | 1959 |
|---|---|---|
| Identification Equipment and Supplies | $ 59,574.00 | $ 51,110.00 |
| Fire Protection Equipment and Supplies | 2,122,000.00 | 2,084,000.00 |
| Physical Security Equipment and Supplies | 1,210,800.00 | 1,206,200.00 |
| Materials for Safeguarding Classified Defense Information | 128,000.00 | 111,800.00 |
| Equipment and Supplies for Emergencies and Disaster Planning | 128,000.00 | 105,900.00 |
| Guard Materials and Equipment | 485,500.00 | 471,800.00 |
| Miscellaneous | 328,110.00 | 304,421.00 |
| TOTALS | $4,461,984.00 | $4,335,231.00 |

Eleven representative plants made the following total purchases during this same period as follows:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Identification Equipment and Supplies | $ 47,127.00 | $ 53,358.00 |
| Fire Protection Equipment and Supplies | 995,157.00 | 1,086,300.00 |
| Physical Security Equipment and Supplies | 229,514.00 | 218,550.00 |
| Materials for Safeguarding Classified Defense Information | 148,018.00 | 143,165.00 |
| Equipment and Supplies for Emergencies and Disaster Planning | 67,227.00 | 78,667.00 |
| Guard Materials and Equipment | 127,393.00 | 235,272.00 |
| Miscellaneous | 610,515.00 | 613,244.00 |
| TOTALS | $2,224,952.00 | $2,326,199.00 |

These six corporations and eleven plants, which do not include either the largest corporations or the largest plants in the nation, therefore, spent a total of $6,686,936.00 during 1958 and $6,661,430.00 during 1959 for security equipment, materials and supplies. This is rather convincing proof of the potential purchasing power of the industrial security supervisors in the nation who requisition, order or purchase these items.

Mr. Hansen's final observation was that if the members of ASIS support those vendors who exhibit at our annual meetings and buy space in our magazine, all things being *equal*, over those who do not, we shall in time influence most others to come to us for their advertising. Since ASIS is the professional society for industrial security in the nation and *Industrial Security* is the official publication for the Society, he believes that these suppliers *should* come to the Society for their advertising and that this is not too much to expect.

In connection with the above remarks of Mr. Hansen, it is worthy to note that all exhibitors at the Sixth Annual Seminar expressed complete satisfaction with their show and many of them said it was the best show they have ever had. The exhibitors were especially pleased with the personal interest displayed by the individual society members in their displays and products.

## AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

Condensed Statement of Cash Receipts and Expenditures for the Fiscal Year Ended August 31, 1960

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CASH BALANCE—September 1, 1959 | | $ 21,333.34 |
| **RECEIPTS:** | | |
| GENERAL ACCOUNTS: | | |
| Dues and Initiation Fees | $42,773.86 | |
| Society Magazine & Subscription | 20,675.73 | |
| North East Regional Meeting | 3,434.05 | |
| Directory Advertising | 2,151.45 | |
| Interest | 345.79 | |
| Miscellaneous | 49.94 | |
| Total Receipts—General Account | $69,430.82 | |
| CONVENTION ACCOUNT: | | |
| Registration Fees, Dues, Receptions, etc. | $23,896.00 | |
| Advance on 1959 Convention | 500.00 | |
| Total Receipts | | $ 93,826.82 |
| Total Cash to be Accounted for | | $115,160.16 |
| **EXPENDITURES:** | | |
| OPERATING ACCOUNTS: | | |
| Salaries | $19,758.50 | |
| Printing | 30,380.76 | |
| North East Regional Meeting | 3,011.71 | |
| Rent | 1,890.00 | |
| Postage and Express | 1,010.99 | |
| Travel, Taxes, Telephone, Supplies, etc. | 5,515.74 | |
| Total Operating Expenditures | $61,567.70 | |
| CONVENTION ACCOUNT: | | |
| Convention Expenditures | $20,382.57 | |
| 1960 and 1961 Convention Deposits | 1,500.00 | |
| | $21,882.57 | |
| OTHER EXPENDITURES: | | |
| Net Payments to Internal Revenue Service for Withholding Taxes | $ 193.16 | |
| Total Expenditures | | $ 83,643.43 |
| CASH BALANCE—AUGUST 31, 1960 | | $ 31,516.73 |

## AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

Condensed Balance Sheet
August 31, 1960

### ASSETS

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CURRENT ASSETS: | | |
| Cash | $31,516.73 | |
| 1960 & 1961 Convention Deposits | 1,500.00 | |
| Accounts Receivable—Member | 50.00 | |
| Total Current Assets | | $33,066.73 |
| FIXED ASSETS: | | |
| Office Furniture and Equipment | 3,000.72 | |
| Less Depreciation taken to date | 1,178.68 | |
| Net Fixed Assets | | 1,822.04 |
| TOTAL ASSETS | | $34,888.77 |

### LIABILITIES

| | |
|---|---|
| CURRENT LIABILITIES: | |
| Payroll Withholding Taxes | 245.37 |
| NET WORTH | |
| SOCIAL EQUITY: | 34,643.40 |
| TOTAL LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH | $34,888.77 |

No new property was acquired during the current fiscal year.

Submitted by:
LOUIS N. CONROY, Chairman
Auditing Committee

Approved by the Board of Directors
October 2, 1960
RICHARD J. HEALY, Chairman
Board of Directors — ASIS


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

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# Tightening Up Industrial Security

## Before World War II, U.S. industry was lax about plant protection. Now it boasts well trained security forces.

Reprinted from the October 15, 1960 issue of *Business Week* by special permission. Copyrighted (c) 1960 by the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Inc.

Industrial security is comparatively new to the American scene and thus the utilization and appreciation of it vary widely in business. For instance:

This week, in a remote California canyon a group of security guards are hunting a mountain lion that disturbed a group of scientists working on a rocket test motor.

At the same time, an FBI-trained security officer is investigating one of his company's executives who is thought to be a homosexual.

Despite the wide extremes in duties, security officers who attended last week's sixth national seminar of the American Society for Industrial Security in Dallas all say their field is changing fast. The day of the old night watchman or the man who just wants to wear a badge and gun is rapidly closing. In place of these people are highly trained executives and above-average guards, who have at their disposal a wide range of electronic detecting devices (pictures below and on following pages).

Eric L. Barr, Jr., chief of security at Electric Boat Div. of General Dynamics and board chairman of ASIS, said the reason for the change is the fact that security is big business today. ASIS estimates there are about 750,000 men involved in industrial security today—compared with under 450,000 in 1950. By comparison, the Commerce Dept. estimates that in 1959 there were a little more than 325,000 state and local police in the nation.

• *Basic Job*—The work the security officer does varies with his place in management within his own corporation. But, generally, his job is safeguarding life, limb, property, information, and production in industry. The amount of money he has available to carry out this job becomes sizeable. At an aircraft company, the security budget is over $1 million this year.

Corporations doing defense work have little or no choice about having a security program—it is required as part of the contract. But, Barr says, "Our people would have security now even if we weren't in defense business."

**RIGHT—OLD RELIABLE "billyclub" still is one of the watchman's weapons against intruders.**

**MOTOROLA TV identification equipment is inspected by security men at meeting of American Society for Industrial Security.**

ASIS estimates, and admits the estimate is low, between $750 million and $1 billion is lost each year by American industry through theft. One security officer said while he could not prove it, he felt more than $500,000 was leaving through his plant gates each year—and he has an above average security force.

• *The Start*—Industrial security before World War II was crude. Management wanted guards to keep employees in and outsiders out. But the government became concerned about the laxity of industrial defense in 1939 and gave the FBI the job of setting up security within the munitions industry.

The agents found American industry virtually had no security. Russell E. White, consultant in industrial security for General Electric Co., said that before the FBI program "American industry was accustomed to do business on the street. . . . Little more was required for record purposes than the name of the individual, Social Security number, and the person to be notified in case of emergency." With the ending of the war many companies continued background investigations, realizing that what was adopted as a wartime measure actually was a good sound business practice.

The FBI's part in setting up industrial security during the war accounts, in a large measure, for the large number of ex-agents in the field today.

ASIS estimates 10% of the security executives are former FBI agents. And some 25% of all security officers are either FBI-trained or trained by some other government branch.

• *College Training*—Today, the field is attracting a different type of person. Three colleges—Michigan State, Northeastern University, and Long Beach State—offer degrees in industrial security. Texas A&M, UCLA, Purdue, and Indiana University offer special courses in industrial security. The move of colleges into this field, ASIS says, has occured within the last six years and intensified in the last three or four years.

Officials of ASIS agree that the salary bracket of a top security man today ranges from about $18,000 to $25,000 with "very, very few going above that." Although a few security officers do leave their field to become members of top management, most are destined to remain at their own level.

At the seminar, the security men voiced one general complaint—they felt their position within the company was not high enough to enable them to work at top efficiency. Some even felt that management hired a top qualified man and then didn't know what to do with either the man or his recommendations. This desire for status must have a limit. John J. Ahern, security head for General Motors, said, "If you get security too high, you run the risk of developing the Gestapo concept."

At General Motors, Ahern is on the corporate level in virtually a consulting position. Plant security is left up to the local or division management. Thus within the corporation, and in the case of such others as Sears Roebuck and General Electric, the actual security arrangements are a decentralized responsibility.

The professional security men recommend that their department be on second level staff with access to top management for special problems.

• *Day-to-Day Policing*—Work done by security officers is not all cloak and dagger—in fact, most say they just don't do that at all. Most of their time is concerned with day-to-day policing within their corporations. Security involves fire protction and safety as well as theft.

In some companies the security officer is allowed more latitude. One of the biggest non-routine jobs is that of background investigation. Gradually companies are learning that it is better to screen out a potential trouble maker before employment rather than have to fight to get him off the payroll later.

In conjunction with the background investigation, some security officers are using a polygraph to double check applicants (BW—Jun.18'60,p98). Clarence Bracy, Vice President of General Plant Protection Corp., said he subjects all potential employees to a polygraph test and gets reactions on questions the applicant would not ordinarily respond to—such as health information, credit, use of liquor and narcotics, homosexuality, and subversive activity information.

**Left to right—SECRET documents can't fall into unauthorized hands when they are reduced to fine powder by paper shredder. SECURITY devices displayed by Minneapolis-Honeywell include door with magnetic locks. Company also exhibited two-way speech and closed-circuit TV equipment. PHONE scrambler is tested by two security officers. Sound garbled at one end of wire is restored to normal at other end. DOOR that opens by pushing a code on buttons is examined by security man.**

• *Preventing Spying*—Security men also do preventive work as well as "putting out brush fires." R. J. Boise, manager of the security department of Ford Motor Co., said in a paper presented at the seminar that in business today top management men are faced with the problems of industrial spying—often by means of electronic devices. He made these suggestions to companies involved in important projects:

• Be alert to suspicious packages in waiting rooms, lobbies, or washrooms.

• Be suspicious of strangers calling at executive offices.

• Investigate any unusual calls or interruptions, or better yet, refrain from discussing important issues by telephone.

• Verify the identity of all linemen and utility service men working in executive offices.

• *Electronic Gadgets*—One of the newer aspects of industrial security is the variety of electronic devices now available for guarding plants, offered by a number of companies.

At the ASIS show, for example, Minneapolis-Honeywell demonstrated a device that embodied a central panel to monitor intrusion detectors, fire alarms, and a remote-controlled TV surveillance camera. One guard sitting at the console can monitor who is going where, what doors are opened, fire dangers, and the like. As a bonus, the guard also can monitor mechanical failures—for example, a malfunction in a boiler room.

Within the last five years several companies—such as Motorola, GE, RCA—have come up with security devices—TV and two-way radios—to tap the expanding market.

Besides their efficiency, these devices also save money. Honeywell figures that a door secured through electronics costs $5,000 in initial outlay. Without electronics the cost would be, say, $40,000, including salaries of guards, uniforms and equipment for the guards, and locks

• *Outside Help*—In addition to electronic gadetry and their own guards, security men sometimes use outside agencies for special problems.

One such agency is Dale Simpson & Associates, in Dallas, a detective organization formed by former FBI agents. Within recent months two oil companies have hired Simpson to track down and recover stolen geology maps worth several million dollars.

The top security officers, generally, go to the private investigators when either extremely delicate work must be done, or the job requires rather "dirty pool" procedures—wire tapping, "bugging," for example. With few exceptions, the security men say their position within the company prohibits their investigating top management.

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